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A MODEST  PROPOSAL  FOR INTERNATIONAL  NOMINAL  TARGETING  (INT) 
ABSTRACT 
The paper reviews the obstacles to successful international 
macroeconomic policy coordination, and then offers a  proposal for 
coordination that  is designed to have  the best chance of 
overcoming these obstacles: an  international version of  nominal 
GNP  targeting.  There are  three sorts  of obstacles to 
coordination: uncertainty, enforcement, and inflation-fighting 
credibility.  Enforcement is always a problem for  coordination, 
but the problem is particularly great in the presence of 
uncertainty.  This is partly because it is difficult to verify 
compliance if the  "performance criteria" are not directly enough  under the control of the authorities, and partly because a 
country may  end  up  regretting cx Post the criterion that  it 
agreed to cx ante if  the criterion is not directly enough related 
to the  target variables about which it ultimately cares.  For 
example, a country that  commits to a narrow range for  the money 
supply may regret the  commitment if a shift in velocity occurs. 
The time-inconsistency of  inflation-fighting has been 
offered as  a  third reason why policy-makers would be  better off 
renouncing period-by-period coordination of discretionary policy- 
making.  But the way to establish inflation-fighting credibility  is to precommit to some nominal anchor.  The paper argues that 
International Nominal Targeting (INT)  is the best choice for 
nominal anchor,  as well as  the best choice for the  performance  criterion by which compliance with international agreements can 
be monitored.  Nominal GNP (or,  better yet,  nominal demand) is 
superior to other candidates such as Ml as a candidate for  the 
nominal variable on which policy-makers should focus,  because it 
is far  more  robust to velocity shifts  and other uncertainties, 
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I.  INnwCrIcv:  PLANS  F LD ?U'Th  REFae(  S}J1D  LTrILy 
PRACIL 
signir  prcposals  for  sr1d  ixretaxy  reform  was  in  the  1960s  a 
pcxflar "parlor gaze" aiir ecaiists.  We  have perhaps seen a revival of 
this sport in the 1980s. 
The  inpetus  bejth such  proposals is  a seriis  one.  Exchaxe rate 
volatility thrnei .it to be higher than was  anticipat1 before the xxve to 
floath exr±are rates in 1973,  arxl the swiis have been partinlarly laxe 
in  the  1980s,  prceptir  proposals  for  gcveznt  action  to  stabilize 
echarqe  rates.  Axxn  the  (alledly)  prnise1  fruits  of  floatir 
exhare  rates  that  have  fail to  materialize  is  insulation of  each 
ccuntry' s ecory frcin  disturbances originatir an its parthers.  This 
insulation property was supposel  to all ntries to  set their policies 
iixeperxently.  Meanwhile,  the  need  to  correct the  large  macroecononic 
imbalances  that arose in the  1980s, withait settirq of  f a r1d recession, 
has reiriforcel  support  for the idea that interdeperxerice  may be inevitable, 
ai that  cntries  shild  set  their policies  cooperatively rather than 
irxeperently.  Proposals  for coordination draw support  frcmt a birgeoniri 
academic literature that, until recently,  was a1ixst unanis in claiinir 
that each  x*zxtzy'  S rnic  welfare was necessarily  higher unier  a regine 
of  ccozination  than  urer  a  ui-oocperative  (Nash)  regime  in  which 
c*mtries set their policies iix1epenently.1 
Flans  for  full-flelgel coordination,  in  the  sense  of  cooperative 
maximization of scse joint welfare function, are likely to be too calex to 
Fischer  (l988b)  surveys  nu.ich of the coatdimtiai literature. 3 
be ilnted  as literally proposed.  Hei the ntivation for sinçler nre 
practical 
2  for  exaiiple  fossfr  on  a  few  key  "ecaictnic 
iricators.'  3it  the  ultimate  reason  for  skepticien  that cooxination 
proposals will in fact be ilnted is that they require nations to give 
up  sa  degree  of  sovereignty  over  policy—makiri  for  the  sake  of 
cxçeration.  Lookir foard frun  1989,  it is unlikely  for many years to 
that  intries will be ready  for  such  a  ccxanitnnt.  In the  first 
place, enfornt is a prlen even when everya benefits relative to the 
Nash  equilthri  [because  each 1ntry ld  do still better by deviatir 
unilaterally fron the agreetnt].  In the secor. place,  given  nertainties 
about  policies ai about  future  disturbares, a  coor±.nation regima  that 
guarantees  higher  welfare  for  each  country  will  nevertheless 
prthably entail  losses for s  countries  in s  years, creatir a 
great tentation for them to break the agrenent.  n marican goverrint, 
for  exançle,  sould  be  unlikely  to  maintain  policies  saorificir  U.S. 
ecczunic  welfare  for the sake of an  international agrent,  for fear  of 
losir political support. 
If a cooperative regime is to be sucxssful,  it nn.st be boilt on  an 
accuialatiofl of trust.  If countries are in every year to resist the short- 
ri  advantages  of deviatir fron the agrerrt for the sake  of the lorer- 
zi.ui gains of maintainin  the cooperative reghe, it is necessary that there 
be either elicit sartions for violations, or ilicit effects  on their 
lor-term repitations.  The  rep.ztations route requires the passage  of tiite 
2 Levine,  Currie ar5.  GaineS  (1989)  present  a  general mathology  for 
analysir the sustainability of coordination agreenents  that take the form 
of single rules. 4 
during whidi u*.ries can  establish  track rrds '  whidi they can  be 
jxid.  sarctia rite reqii.res  a  ccsmiibnent to  give  up national 
sovereignty, for whidi, again, intries will riot be  politically  ready for 
sax  tine.  This  is  major prthli with  a  prcposad  rethrn to  ficad 
ecthamge  rates,  a gold staMard, ar others of the airitis  plans for vrld 
itionstaxy refore.  They presue a rld of surrerxier sovereignty,  ar 
there is  rio  evident  pathway leadir there frcin r  current rld.  "you 
can't get there fr  here." 
The mst  0  can anticipate is that  coordination will begin on a ll 
scale  in  the  1990s,  with  cc*ntries  givir  up  just  a all amt of 
sovereignty in return  for nall expectad gains.  Sudi coordination .ild  be 
pror.irio successful if anr.u international ecic agreents re 
riot  upletely  devoid  of  subetare,  if the  agrents actually  causad 
camtries to n.ify 
their  policies  —  even if only a little —  fron what  they otherwise ild 
have been,  ard if the results can be seen  to have raisad rnic  welfare— 
again,  even if only a little. 
If rdiriation on a  email  scale  is successful in the 1990s,  then it 
will  establish  the  prerequisites  of  txst  aM  confidence  rt1ei  for 
coordination on a n.erate scale in the 21st century: national track records 
of  onpliance with  the  international  agreemants,  or  perhaps  sufficient 
consensus as to the benefits  to al1 the establishiEnt of sanctions for 
future rion-cliax.  The point  is that,  at each stage,  a  record of 
successful coordination will politically al1, an  increase in the degree of 
camnitnent  to  coordination  in the next  stage.  What  is needad,  then,  is 
really a prcposal for a seauence  of coordination regires, an overall plan in 5 
whith the dree  of  coordination can bin at  a  enall  "nailcrk" ai be 
gradually raisad fr  there  [in theory, w'y readfl the  level  of full 
coordination of policies]. 
This paper itains, in additicti to a review  of the tacles to futire 
progress  tard  coordthatiori,  a  preliminary  mInation  of  two  nøiest 
prcsals for the form that sxfu]. coordination might take.  is an 
internationa]- version of targetir ncininal P (or aregate dr). 
prcçosal  might be cal].ad  mr,  for 1nternatiaa]. Naninal  Targetirq.3  The 
other is a  supranationa].  bank,  sanetimas  callad a Hoscini Fur, whith ccold 
intervene  in the  foreign earqe irarkets, witiit national  central  banks 
surrerxerirq their n rights  to cçerate  in the markets.  In eath case— 
International Naninal  Tazgetin ar a Hosani ix — a key elnent of the 
prtçosal is that it ccold begin on a  very seall scale, baild up trust ar 
fideie in the institution slily, ax ts  progress to higher degrees of 
coordination. 
The esserce of the arguxnei*  for the need for coordination is that there 
are  international  externalities  or  spillover  effents.  If  these 
externalities did rct exist, i.e., if eath ccixtry was tmaffected by d-ianes 
in other ntries, then the decentralized rxmocçerative solution wa.ld be 
cptimal;  there ld be  little  role  for  international asetings  or  a 
supranatiai  institution  to coordinate policies  [just  as  there wld be 
little role for goverirtt intervention  in the dcttic ecany if danestic 
markets  furctioned petitively ar withci.xt externalities]. 
3  The flIT proposal appearS in brief  form in Frankel (l988c).  Frankel 
(1988d)  offers a versit of the zrjl of  ].ersth as the jxesent 6 
caiwt )a whether  or  what  kird  of  ooordi.nation  is  desirable 
without  first  krxiwirg  the  nathre  of  the  externalities.  Is  the  Nash 
rKnxocçerative  equilibrian  too  tractionaxy,  biiae of  a  proclivity 
t.ard lVbear..+thy_rmigborH policies?  Then joint expansion  is called for. 
This, of irse, was the lic of the "locative theory" that gave rise to 
the  1978  8onn Suisnit.  Or,  on the other hard, is the existir equilibrium 
overly  inflationary?  In that case joint discipline 1d be called for. 
This is  the  apparent tivation urerlyii the  Eurcpean Monetary Systn. 
Perhaps  the  prchlen is that each try  seeks by its policy mix to raise 
real  interest  rates,  attract capital  inflows  aid appreciate  its .1rrery, 
thereby reducin  the Constmr Price Irdex for any given level  of c*.ttprt aid 
employsent.  This description se  to characterize sai major cmtries in 
the  early  1980s.  Or  perhaps  the  prthln,  rather  than  "ccspetitive 
appreciation,"  is "caipetitive depreciation,"  as was feared at Bretton Woois 
in  1944  on  the  basis  of  the  experiei  of  the  1930s.  Each  kird  of 
externality ild inply  a  different  ]drd of apprcpriate  coordination  to 
acthess it. 
In Part  II of this paper,  wa ress prchlem  corcernhx  the overall 
degree of  expansion  of macroecanic policies, whether  nxretaxy aid fiscal 
policies are too tit  or too loose, rather than the pzer mix of the two. 
In Part III of the paper, iicre briefly,  wa aress the problem of exctharqe 
rate variability.4  It  is  left as  a tic for  futore  work  to consider 
'' If the problem with the Nash rirccperative equilibrium is tha4it to 
be caipetititve  appreciation or depreciation, then an agreement to nvve to a 
regine  of greater exchange rate stability will  solve the problem.  If,  on 
the other hard,  the problen is tha.ht to be overly catractionary or overly 
expansionary  imznetazy policy,  then such a  switch in regimes  may  exacerbate 
the problem by irxeesirz the degree of intanetiamJ. traiesiseiai of disti.rtmr. 7 
prthl of  the degree  of  aneion sisi.iltaz-zslv with prthl of  the 
itazy/fisca.l policy mix, real interest rates ard the exthar rate. 
II. OV  o'rAcr.s W DDUD NSI1i  OIACIcV 
II  .A istic Policv-Makii 
Macroeconanic  policy-makir  is  always  a  tradeoff  beten  the 
advantages  of discretion on  the  hard ard rules on  the other.  In the 
past,  writers  coxrned  with  either  one  of  the t  pxthl  often 
siaplistically assumed away the other.  If the aim is to maximize eic 
lfare  (a  funotion  of  .itpt aid inflation)  only  for  a  given  pericd, 
ignorir lorg-z.ui inplicatia for  expected  inflation,  discretion can  be 
shtn  to  be  unairigus1y serior to  rules;  after all,  hi can  one 
possib].y gain by agreeir to limit one's abilities beforehard to respcrd to 
develcpints in the  ecxmuny?  If  ignores the possibility of short-run 
disthzbais,  on  the other hard,  rules  can  be sln to be tma±igusly 
serior  to  discretion  in  a  lor-rm  espilibrium;  macroic policy 
cait at  fct c*itp.xt  in the la z'.r anyway,  aid precamnittir to a ncmdnal 
aiior can reduce expected inflation ard therehy reduce actual inflation. 
There  are  a  few  excellent  surveys  of the  literature concerning  tima 
inoonsistenoy, pre-tini1nt ard ritati, aM its izplicatiais for the 
older dehate over rules versus discretion.  See, for exazple,  Barro  (1986), 8 
Fisder (1988a),  arxl goff (1987).  It s1d be clear by xu that neither 
extr in the date represents  the cxxçlete ocrrect axr.  On the 
hax, if the political systan' s po1icy—makir pros is afl  to cptimize 
on a pirely shozt-n.ui  basis, the 'xito  will be over-expansion.  Thus s 
degree  of  1er—term  nithent  to  resist  inflationary  teinptat.icns  is 
imlicatad,  even  if it is a  decision to insulate the Central  Bank frczn the 
political pros rather  than  formal  czmdthent  to  a  rninaJ.  arthor or 
rule.5  On the other hard,  in a world where r  disturbarces  alcz, it 
is important that the goverrsent retain at least s  ability to respor to 
stabilize the eny.  solution is  degree of iithnt, xit less 
than 100  per cent, to said rxiiinal axxor6 
In the context of dstic policy—xna]cir,  this paper  makes  rc jtrxt 
on  the  desirable  degree  of  pre-cnitunt  to  a  zxinal  target. 
Whiie  Milton  Frian has  justifiably  had  ncre  influerce on this 
issue than one hinian  being is usually able to have,  there have l  been two 
aspects of his campaign against the Faderal  Reserve Board that are p.xzzlirx. 
First, his arg.mnt against discretion in xxcnetaxy policy-making is largely 
basad on the analysis  in Friadman  az Schwartz that the FeSeral Reserve made  the Depression  of the 1930s  nxch worse than it otherwise ld  have been by  "aflcMir' the  Ml  ncney  supply to fall.  Yet  in recent decades  he  has 
canpaigned for the Fad to do precisely what he aises then of dOing in the 
1930s:  set  a  firm target  for the ilxrietaxy base rather than for Ml.  The 
secord,  even  ucre  pozzling,  aspect  is  that  Frinan  ard  his  fell, 
ncnetarists  claim  to believe  that U.S.  xxey grth wfld be  slower ard 
sore stable if netary policy were plaoad sore urder the xtrol of the  deratic political process,  via the Treasury  or the U.S.  Onrress,  than 
under  the itrol of  elitist central  bankers  like  Paul  Volcker.  It is 
partioilarly  ironic that, when a menber of the xetarist Shadow  Open Market 
Caxunittee fimally becama Treasury  tinder-Secretary for )bnetary Affairs in  the early  198  Os,  his view that the ncney gzwth rate was danger.isly  high 
was overruleS by a Treasury Secretary and White Hc*zse who sht to pressure  the Fed for faster xxcney growth leadix  to the 1984 election. 
6 lboff (l985b)  shows that s  intermediate degree of camnkbnent  to a 
target is optimal for zcnetary policy. 9 
na1ogis1y,  when we thrn to international coordination, we take as given 
by the political process the degree of eitsent to coordination.] 
alt it can be azued that,  whatever the degree of  prexmwitmant to a 
xuithial target,  rmiinal P (or rma1nal dssar) makes a mare suitable target 
than the fair other iuninal variables  that have been  prcosed: the ey 
supply,  the price  level,  the price of gold,  or the  exctarige  rate.  Ihe 
argument has been made well by others.7  In the event of distuxbares in the 
banking  systes,  disturbaxS in  the piblic's  dauard  for lr'iey,  or  other 
distuzbaieS affectix the denard  for goods, a policy of holding rninal P 
steady insulates the euw; neither real  rr the price level neel 
be affected.  In the event of disthzteS to supply, s  as the oil price 
increases of the 19700, the change is divided equi-proxtionately  between 
an iiease in the price level ard a fall in c*itpit.  For sana or*intries, 
this is rhly the split that a discretionary  policy wcEld  choose anyway.8 
In general,  unless  the  chjective ftion pits precisely  equal weights  on 
inflation  ard real gr.ith,  fixing xinal P will net give precisely  the 
right answer.  alt if the ice  is  the  available rinal arxthors 
runinal (P gives an ontc characterized br greater stability of a.rtit 
ard the price level.  n Açeodix to this paper  shis that a runinal P 
Gordon  (1985),  Hall  (1985),  Taylor  (1985)  ard allum  (1987, 
1988ab), for eunle, argue in favor of targetix  ncininal QP in the closed- 
econany context.  The idea also has prcpocents in the United Kirqk*: Bean 
(1983), I'de  (1984) ard ittaii (1987).  Miller ard Williamaco  (1987, 7—10) 
prcpose targeting iuninal demard  as part of their "blueprint"  for  exchange 
rate target zones. 
8  In  1974,  Switzerlard  can be given  as an example of  a mtzy that 
chose  to take the adverse su1y  shock almast entirely in the fore of lost 
inecxe  ard esployment,  in  order to restore price stability,  Swoden as an 
example of a rxtry that dune to take it aJmast  entirely in the  form of 
inflation, in order to preserve .itpit ard aTployment, ard the United  States 
as an example in  between. target strictly daninates a ney sup1y target,  in the swe of ininfriizirq 
a  quadratic  loss  ftnti,  regardless  hi iiortant  inf1atia—fjghtJ. 
credibility is. 
To  take  an exan1e fros recant history,  the Federal erve, citir 
large velocity shifts, decided begirmii in late 1982  to all  Ml to break 
firmly itside their pre-anrs target za.  Ml  grew 10.3  per cent per 
year fros  1982:11 to 1986:11.  Scs sexvers have suggested  that the Fed 
was  fo11ir a general  policy of targetir rina1 (IP.  For fr  years 
the nnetarists decried the betrayal of the ney grc*th rule, aix warnel 
that a  major  return  of  inflatiai  was  inininent.  Nctxxty  can dcubt,  in 
retrospect that the Fed dose the right rse.  Even with the reccvery that 
began in 1983 ax continued  through the fr  years ai beycr, nominal P 
grew  nore  slily than the  ncney  suply:  8.0  per  cent  per  year.  Thus 
velocity  declined  at  2.3  per  cent per  year,  in  cutmst to  its past 
historical pattern of increasiru at roughly  3  per cent a  year.  If the Fed 
had folled the explicit netarist prescripti of rigidly pre—snittirq 
to a  noney grth rate 1r  than that of the prir  peri, sudr  as  3 
per cent, ard velocity had folled the same path,  then  nominal QIP ld 
have grn at ly 0.7  per cent a  year.  This nurker is an uer brx1, 
because  with  even  ler inflati than  occurred, velocity wculd  aJ.ncst 
certainly have  fallen even nre than it did.  The i1icatiom se clear 
that the 1981-82  recessic ild  have lasted arther five years 11 
11.8 ctstacles to internatiaJ. Policy oorinatice 
After the in.iti.al e  uasln for the gains frce cuordinaticz,  especially 
at the thecretical level, a nuirer of aists  have in recent years  been 
pointin  cut sa  of its diffinltieS [binnixq, at the piblic level, with 
Fe].dsteirl  (1983,  1988)). 
The stacles to  implntfl a suessfUl  regi of  macrofliC 
policy ordinatii are of three sorts: uncertainty,  enforcrxt, ar tire- 
,sistent  inflation—f  ighth  crelibility.  Difficulties of enfornt ar 
credibility have  received the st  atteriticri frce econceists.  Even when a 
cuozdination package guarantees that eath mtzy will be better off than it 
ld  be in the non—oocperative equilibrium, the zxtry will be able to do 
better still if it "cheats" on the agrent.  That is, it will be able to 
do  better  in the  short-run,  assuming that the other cntries  leave their 
policies as agreed; in fubire periods,  the other intries will  presumably 
retaliate by  also abar3onir the agreeflt.  Bit  econ3nists have  prthably 
over-aSiZed the difficulties of enforcEt1t (Ke.nen,  1987,  31—36,  thinks 
so  9),  ar  uner-emithaSized  the  difficulties  of  uncertainty.  If 
policymakers  cculd be certain as to hi variss policy changes w.ild affect 
their  eunic  chjectives,  it  might  nct  be  very  difficult  to  enforce 
cooperative agrenerxts.  Bit uncertainty is in fact ermaic to international 
macroriC  policy-making. 
Holthaln  aix3.  Hhes  Hallett  (1987,  130)  agree:  "Ecorzd.StS  have 
perhaps focused  on  ixral  hazard prle because  of  their  interesting 
1ical character  rather than because of their Lpirical  iiçortance.  It 
semis  likely  that uncertainty  ar el  disagreaTent  are greater chetacles 
to internatiorIaJ cxxperatiOn." 12 
As  we will  see,  urrtainty is of three kinds:  wmartainty  regaxdin 
the current  and  future  position of the eny, uncertainty  reardin  the 
desirable  cçt.tma for  the target  variables,  and urtainty  reardixTj the 
effects  on the target variables  of thares in those policy irtxts that 
the  policy-makers  directly trol.  Each  of  these  areas of  urrtainty 
makes  it difficult for  policy-makers  in  ntxy to ki what  policy 
charges to ask of its tradir partners, and to }o what policy charxes it 
itself shculd be wi.llir to make in return.  Even  assumirg that there are nc 
prchl of  enforoemant,  a  cooperative package of policy charqes that each 
ocuntry thinks will benefit it cxild,  ex most,  easily turn cut  to  make 
thugs worse rather than better.  This .ild be the cut if the baseline 
level of cutpit,  for exanpie, turns cut to be different than expected, or if 
the cptiim.im  level  (e.g.,  potential cutpit)  turns cut to be  different than 
expected,  or if a  foreign expansion  of xnetary policy,  for exanple, turns 
cut to have a different effect on dastic cutpt than expected. 
Urrtainty greatly catplicates the  enforcemant prthlee as well.  In 
the first place, policy-makers  do nct have direct itrol over the variables 
that we refer to as their "policies."  Central banks cannct determine the 
ny  supply precisely,  because of disthrbai  within the ban)th systen or 
in the wider ecauny' s desarxl  for ney.  Nor  can a specific policy-maker 
who is engaged in international notiatiais determine his ca.ntry  's fiscal 
policies precisely.  For  this reason,  it can be difficult to hold policy- 
makers  amtable  for  deviations  of  the  policy  variables  fron  the 
cooperative bargain that they agree to. 
In the second place,  ex ante uncertainty seans that there will be sai 
states of the  world  in  which the temptation to cheat  is especially great 13 
because te oc*intzy  thrr oit ex tost to lose a lot fr  abidin  by  the 
agresmant  (relative  to unilaterally violatirg  the  agreamant,  ax perbaps 
also  relative  to nsver havirg made the agreent to bein with).  In sud 
cirtazs, the short-run gains fros abrtqatirg may  itweigh the 1er- 
term gains fran  tix  cxxçeration. 
A third kir of  thstacle has  been  pointad xt by Ioff (1985).  A 
cooperative  agreamant  that oe in  raisirg  ecuiic  welfare  in a 
period will,  if it takes the form of joint reflatia,  raise expectations  of 
future inflation ax may thus raduca enic welfare in the 1aer run.  In 
suth a ciratare, rencwirq oocperation may be a way that mtries can 
pre-mit to less inflationary policies. 
This  part  of  the  paper  examines  these  different  to 
sucreseful  international  coordination,  ax  then  argues  that  INT,  an 
international  version  of  targetiog  nc*ninal  GP  (or  nanina].  aggreate 
daxzxI), is re likely than  other types of coori1nation to surnxxuxt these 
cbstacles. 
11.8.1 Prless of uirtaJ.ntv 
There are three things that a ntry ideally neads to kni before it 
even  can  enter nagotiations  with  other  mtries  on  coordinatod policy 
cbajes. ( at is the initial position of the daistic euny, relative 
to the  cptiimm values of the target variables?  (2)  %flat are the correct 
weights to pit on the varicos possible target variables?  [This irc].i.es the 
question  of  whith  variables  shculd  be  excltod  frau  sideration 
altogether, ar whith 1zltL]  (3) ?at effect does eath unit dange in 14 
the dstic  croecxxnic policy variables  (ard the foreign)  have ai the 
target  variables;  that is, what is the rrect  ne1 of the rld  eccey? 
These  three eierits fo1l siçly frzn  the a1graic eqressii  for 
the eunic thj active futicn.  We specify here a ftzticr of three target 
variables, althh  we 1d  as easily have re  or fer. 
(1)  W  =(]12)  (y2+wx2+sp) 
(1*)  W  (1/2)  (y*2 + ***2 + W*p*P*  ), 
- 
where W  is the quadratic ices to be m1nimiz, y is cutpit  (e3çressed in ic, 
form  ard relative to its timan), x is the orrent art (express1 as a 
percentage of  QIP  ard again relative to its tinwi), p  is the inflaticn 
rate, WA  is the relative weiit plao  the irrent ant  jective, Up 
is the relative weit pia ai the inflatir jective, ard an asterisk 
(*)  dertes the analcxjc*is variables  for the foreign  cmtry.  We will refer 
to t  policy  nstrunEnts: the ney suply, in  (in l  form),  ard  goverveent 
expezxiture  g  (as a percentage  of (4P). 
The  marginal  welfare effects of dwes in these policy variables  are 
then given by: 
(2)  dW/din  (Y)Ym +  wx(x)X. +  Wp(P)P 
(3)  = 
(Y)Yg 
+ 
Wx(x)Xg  + Wp(P) 
(4)  q/dm*  (Y)Ym* + wx(x)x1*  + p(P)Pm* 
(5)  dW/* = 
(Y)Yg*  + Wx(x)Xg* + Up(P)Pg* 
(2*)  dW*/11 =  (Y*)Y*m  +  W*x*(X*)X*m + W*p*(P*)P*m 
(3*)  dW*/dg  (y*) Y*g + w**  (X*) X*g +  w*p* (p*) P*g 15 
(4*)  */de*  (y*)y* + w*x*(x*)x*m* + 
(5*) */dg*  =(Y*)Y*g* +  W*x*(X*)X*g*  + W*p*(P*)P*g* 
where the  policy niiltiplier  effect  of ey  on itp1t is given by y, the 
effect of y  on the ait amt by x, etc.  If  wished to solve 
for  the cçtizun,  ld  set these  derivatives  equal to  zero  (with the 
target variables  (y),  (x),  etc., first expressed as linear furctias of the 
policy variables  m,  g,  etc.).  In the Nash imxxçerative  equilibrium (in 
whith eadi coirTtry takes the other's policies as given),  ld  need ally 
equaticns  (2),  (3),  (4*)  &1  (5*)  for the BolutiQl.  Eath  cxxntry igrres 
the effect that its policies have  on the other ztzy, so equaticxs  (4), 
(5),  (2*)  an (3*)  do rxt enter.  Ireied this is precisely  the  starxard 
reason  why  the nrcocperative equilibrium is  sub—optimal.  These  oes— 
mtry effects enter ally In the determination of the cooperative soluti. 
Before  they decide  on a policy diarqe, policy-aakers im.st at least )c'i 
the sign of the correspa3.irq derivative.  Equation  (2), or any other of the 
eit derivatives above, neatly illustrates the three kings of uncertainty. 
First is uncertainty abc*it the initial pceiticn, the variables, y, x ard p. 
Pceitial uncertainty  in turn breaks down into three parts:  (a)  uncertainty 
about  the  current  value  of  the  target  variable  in  question10;  (b) 
uncertainty  over  how the  target  variables  are likely to ive during the 
forthnlng year or e  in the abee of policy  dianges, the  "baseline 
forecast"  this information is relevant on the as&mption  that any policy 
cbares agreed  upon will  have  their major  inpact beginning  in a year or 
10 For  exanle,  Mankiw  ard  Shapiro  (1986)  fird  that  the  staniard 
deviation of the revision fran the preliminary estimate of the real growth 
rate to the final nuer is 2.2 percentage points. 16  e,  rather than 1irl1  tely11); ard  (c)  tzrtainty as to the locatiai of 
the cptiim.nn value of the target variable.12 
The point is clear.  The policy—maker's estisates of the current  values 
of y,  x or p in his ctry mild easily be off by several  percentage  points 
in either directia, which cild flip the signs of the correspc1in three 
teras  —  any e  of which .ild chaxe the  sign  of the derivative of the 
cjective  furtiai —  in  each of equaticz  (2)- (5).  Thus it is entirely 
pcssfl,le that the cntxy ld  ask its partners in nagotiatians  to eçiard, 
or that it cild agree to a partner's request that it itself expard, when 
these thares ld  in fact e  the ey  in the wr  directicm 
To  take  historical  exaiçle,  in  the late 1970s the U.S.  policy- 
makers,  looking at the available  eoc*anic data,  coixthxled that insufficient 
gr,th in the world  ecorny was  the prthles of the tima.  This as&mpti 
was the basis of the  1978  Bonn Si..it agreint for coordinated expansico 
with Japan ard Eure, Germany in particular.  By the erd of the decade, the 
consensus  had bee that  fightir  inflatico  was  the  top  priority,  not 
acoeleratin  real  growth.  A natural way of interpretir the vi.i — widely 
held  in  Germany  at  least —  that  the  results  of  the  Bonn-coordinated 
11  Kenen ard Schwartz  (1986)  have studied the a.racy of current—year  forecasts  by the  IMF  World  Econonic CXtlook for the  last  fifteen  years. 
They f  lid that the root maan squared  error an the &nmait Seven .]ntries  is 0.773 percentage points  for real growth  ard 0.743 percentage points for 
inflation.  These prediction  errors,  relatively  nall, are in themaelves 
large  eruh  to reverse  the signs  of the derivatives  of the welfare  ftrtion 
equations  (2)-  (5).  Errors ild presnably be nuth larger  for the horizons 
of two  years or itre that are prthably st  relevant for policymaking.  Many 
major  international ecorttric nodels  show  the effects  of inetary ard  fiscal policy peaking  in the secorxi year in the  case of .xtpit,  ard not 
reaching a peak within six years in the case of the price level or current 
accaint.  See Bryant et al  (1988). 
12  Econanists  disagree as to the correct  estimate of the natural rate  of untploymant or the level of potential itpit, for exanpie. 17 
expansicr thrx  cut  in  retrospect to  have  been  detrintal,  is that 
unanticipated develrents,  particularly the large izease in oil prices 
associated with the  s'.ñien Iranian crisis of  1979,  u,ved the world e1rj' 
to a  highly  inflationary position where  was  no  lcrer called 
for13 
The seI sort of urcertainty present  in the equations is urrtairxty 
regarding the proper weights  w, ar  Wp to pit on the target variables  in the 
furctiori.-4  This issue is even re  subjective than the issue of 
the cptinal values of the target variables.  In a  society where the weights 
that irdividual actors place on inflation (or the cueixt aint) vary frau 
zero to  infinity, the  likelinood 1aist be jtged very high that any  given 
gcvernt is Using weights that differ fran the  "correct"  - that wculd 
follow  fran  any  given  criterion.  One  can  see  fran  the  equations that 
pitting insufficient weight on fighting  Inflation, for exauple, can have the 
sane effect  as unierestimating the  baseline  inflation rate:  the  policy- 
auker  in  coordination  exercises  may  ask  his  trading partners to  adopt 
13  Another  unexpected  deve1c.unt in the late l970s  was the dnward 
shift in the demar  for ney In the United  States.  This disturbai,  like 
the oil  shock,  maarit  that the planned  growth rate of uney turned cut ex 
post to be nre inflationary than expected. 
14  One  way  to thtain estimates for the weights is to follow  (Xiiz ar 
Sadie  (1986),  who ass. that as of 1984 policy-makers  were cptinizing their 
jective furctiie  in a  Nash  equilibrian,  ard  infer the welfare  weights 
that  they isist have  had  in  order  to produce  the  cutcas for 
cutpit,  inflation  ani.  the current aaint.  The  estimates  thrn cut to be 
very sensitive to suth things as the ie]. of the trj  that the policy-  ers are as  to  have.  [To  equate  the  inferred  weights with  the 
correct rates,  as  Ouiiz  ard Sadie  do,  of .irse requires not only that the 
policy-makers  were  indeed seeking to optimize  In a Nash equilibrian in that 
particular  year,  b.xt also  that they  know the correct iel, the correct 
weights, ard the correct position of the xeiy  relative to the cptinnsi.] 18 
eansionazy policies  when tractionaxy policies are in fact  called for. 
This is precisely  the mistake that by 1980  scan ccrchded had been made by 
the tinited States.  Fron the viewpoint of the Rep.iblicans  who  were elected 
to the presidercy in that year,  or the Social Deiorath who c  to power in 
Germany abcut the s  tim, the po].icy-akers  who had agreed to coordinated 
reflation at  the  Bonn  S.m!nit  of  1978  had  pit insufficient weight on  the 
cbjective of prios stability. 
The thiz sort of urcertainty pertains to the policy iiltipliers,  the 
derivatives y,  Ygi  etc.,  in  equations (2)- (5*),  tel1ir the  effect of 
cthares  in  the  nney  sup1y ar  governnsnt  experiiture  on  the  target 
variables.  ny given governmEnt  is likely to be usir policy sultipliers 
that  differ  substantially  fron  the  "tni&'  ones,  ar  that  may  even  be 
incorrect  in  sign.  One  way  of  seeirg  this  is to  note  the trzTJ 
variation in sultipliers arir  to different  schools of thc*.ht,  or even 
accordin  to different  estimates in ncdels of 9mainstream" macroeccrzijst. 
They  canrct  all  be  correct, ax it se highly prthable  that  no sir1e 
icdel is in fact exactly right.15 
It  is  possible  to  illustrate  the  potential  rare  of  sultiplier 
estimates in sate detail.  In a  recent exercise corxucted at the Brookirs 
15  The  German view that the  1978  Bonn Sit  entailed joint reflation 
which,  in retrospect,  was inarriate has been used  above  to illustrate,  alternatively,  urcertainty alxiit the  baseline forecast  (the unanticipated  oil shack of  1979)  or uncertainty abit the thjective  function  (the prer  weight  to  be  pla  on  inflation  versus  growth).  A  third  possible  interpretation is zcdel uncertainty:  the Germans believe that the slcpe of  their Aregate Supply cirve turned out to be steer than they,  or at least  the  Amaricans,  th4it it wild  at  the  tine.  This  interpretation  is 
plausible if one  believes that the German labor market is characterized by a 
high  degree  of  real  wage  rigidity,  as  was  pointed  out  by  Branson ard 
Rotanberg  (1980). 19 
institution,  12 1eir eutric e1s of the international macroeny 
sitailated the effects of specific policy diares in the United States ar in 
the rest of the  16  The e1s participath were the Federal Reserve 
Board's  i1ti-CnitrY )del,  the  Eurcpean Eic Ozsix&nttty'  s  Ozzxçact 
tel, the  Japanese Eccaic Plansir  Agency ircdel,  Project  Link,  Patrick 
Minford'S  Liverpool  )de1,  the  McKithon-Sadis Gla1 nel,  the  Sl- 
Littennan VAR el, the O'  s Interlink e1, Jdn Taylor's  nde1,  the 
arton Eitrios ual,  ar  the  Data  PeS1rCeS,  Inc., el.  The 
variation in the estimates is large, not just in magnitie bit also in sign. 
The effect of fiscal or ixretary expansion on dmstic itpit ax inflation 
is usually at least of the positive sign that one would expect.  [Even here 
there are exceptions as regards inflation: the VAR,  Wharton ar Link xcdels 
sanetimes shi expansion  causin  a  reduction  in the CPI,  prthably due to 
effects via mar1wp pricir.]  ait disagreeflt an  the a1s  becces twh 
ttcre n  when we turn to the international effects. 
The  areas  of  greatest  disagreement  ai the  eDetric rels 
rea.rdirq international transmission are not the same  as a  might  expect 
fran the theoretical literature.  A  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  is transmitted 
positively to the rest of the O  in 10 out of 11 els, ar an expansion 
in the other ntries is transmitted positively to the United States  in 9 
out  of  10  ircels,  whereas  in  theory  fiscal  transmission can  easily  be 
neative.17  The greatest ajicunt  of  disagreement trs, rather,  on  the 
effect  of  a  ticnetary  expansion  on  the  datstic  current  aamt,  ar 
16  See the voltm edited by Bryant et al (1988). 
17  For  exaxple,  if  capital tiity  is  sufficiently  la ai  a 
depreciation of the datic curreD! is xritrectiaaxy  the reign cainty. 20 
therefore a the foreign rrent a.uit aid c.itpit level.  There are twe 
flictii  effects.  On the or hard,  the itary expansi raises ir 
ard therefore  uiports.  On  the  other  hard,  it depreciates  the rrency, 
which terxs to inçrove the trade balare.  [In the !4dell—Flnir e3. the 
net effect on the current ant  nust be positive.  18j  it ta-na cut that a 
U.S.  iinetary eansion srsens the current aint in  8  cut of  11 ndels, 
ard a nnetary expansion  in the other 0  itries rsena their current 
amts in 5 cut of 10 ie1s.  (In it  ncdels the rest of the 4irdell- 
Flenir  tranission  mecbanism  is reversed  as  well:  the  foreign  current 
amt ard foreign iine rise rather than fall.] 
at  happens if U.S., European aid Japanese policy-makers  proceed with 
coorithation efforts despite disagreemartts s  as these?  In Frankel ard 
Pcckett  (1986,  1988)  ard  Frankel  (1988),  I  used  the 3rookirxs  sirulations 
[ard the welfare weits frau adiz aid Sas] to consider the possibilities 
when  governments coordinate usir ocnflictir imDdels.  Ccuntries will  in 
general be  able to  fird a  package of ocordinated policy chamges that each 
believes will  leave it better off,  even thcuh each has a different view of 
the effects aid thus may not urderstard why the other is wilhir to go along 
with the package.  The actual effects deperd  on what the true ndel is.  If 
we consider ten possible iels, there are 1,000 binations of iels that 
can be used to represent the beliefs of the U.S.  policy-makers,  the beliefs 
of non-U. S.  policy—makers,  aid reality.  We  fird that nnetary coordination 
results in gains for the United States in 546  cases, losses in 321 cases aid 
18 A  reduction  in interest  rates  causes  a net capital cutfli which,  urzr a fltirg athare rate, inplies an ie  in U  rt xit  belarx. 21 
no  effect  on  the  objective  f.uctia  (to fr  significant digits)  in 133 
cases.  Coordisatiat  results  in gains for the rest of the O cntries in 
539  cases, as against losses in 327 ax no effect in 134. 
A  ni.mber  of  authors  have  taken ection to this  fin±1r, ax its 
iiiçlication that unoertainty  constitites  a seriis  obstacle to sucoessfuJ. 
internationa].  policy  coordination.  Hoitham ar Hughes  Hallett  (1987), 
Frerikel,  Goldstein are. Masson  (1988,  31—32),  ar Gosh ar Masson  (1988ab) 
argue that, in a world in which different de1s abo.z, it is not sensible 
to  asstm  that each policy-maker  acts  as  if he kr'zs with  certainty the 
correct iadel.  Such critici mild be a1ied to the original paper, 
Frankel ar Rockett  (1986).  Bit extensials in the p.b1ished Frankel ai 
Pcickett  (1988,  337—338)  ar  Frankel  (1988,  19—21)  papers  relax  the 
assi.mption that each  policy-maker  acts as if he or she is certain as to the 
correct ndel.  Policy—makers  are assumad  to assign probability weights  to 
each of the possible isels, ai then to maxinize their expected we1fare.-9 
Coordination  then turns out to raise U. S.  welfare in only 20 per cent of 
the cases, ar to raise non-U.S. welfare in 60 per cent of the cases. 
iosh  (1987)  ar tceh ar Masscat  (1988a)  claim  that the presenoe of 
ircdel  uncertainty  —  far frau renerirY  rdination unattractive as in my 
results — actually furnishes  an  argueent  in favor of coordination, provided 
policy-makE's  rrLize  that  they  do  not  1o the  tnme  imdeJ..  Their 
19  the  case where the weights are uniform,  each  policy—maker  is 
playir by  the sama  "ccmiprctnis&' nel.  One  possible  way of interpretir 
such a canprauise on the iel is as a type of coeration that consists  of 
negotiatir over the correct view of the world rather than rotiatir  over 
policies.  See  Frankel  (1988).  Kenen  (1987,  8—9)  ar Bryant  (1987,  8) 
stress that excharge  of  information  is a useful function of  international 
cocperatiort  broadly defined. 22 
arg.mnt is essentially that if the policy-in&cer has rations]. eectatics, 
then the prabiity  weights  he  assigns to the  possible nels  (1/10 to 
each  of  10  in ir e,erint)  will  oorrespcx1  to  the  best  weights 
available.  This  argumant is oorrect  (1)  assumiog that govexrsnts do  in 
fact assign the best weights to alternative els (which ai  other thiogs 
iplies that all goverxnts share the s  perti,  which does rt  seen 
to be the  case),  ar  (2)  as  a statnt abc*.it ex ante welfare  only.  If 
governments do rct agree on the correct set of weights to assign the itcdels, 
the iiiplications even for correct ex ante welfare are precisely  the s  as 
the original implicatians  of disaqreient  as to the correct e]. are for 
true  ex  post  welfare:  coordination uld make  the mtxy worse  of  f in 
expected value.  Furthernre,  even  if the ntries do  kixM  the  best 
weights, it is still quite possible that the true nel  will thrn cxit to lie 
far  frcin  the weighted—average  ndel  ax coordination will  reduce ex post 
welfare.  It is ex post welfare that shld be the ultimate  iterion; to 
argue  otherwise ld  be essentially to argue that what matters  is that the 
President blithely perceives that he has made the best decision,  even if the 
cnsences for the ecorxrj may in fact be calamitous. 
Holtham ar Hthes Hallett  (1987)  axxl Kenen  (1987)  argue that we should 
rule out coordination (i.e., that it will not take place) in cases where the 
bargain is not "sustainable,"  defined as cases where one party expects that 
the other —  even  though happy to go alorg with the bargain — will in fact 
lose fron it.  The susition is that the first party will expect the other 
policy-maker  to abrogate the agretnt next period,  when the error becones 
evident.  To  this,  one can make  two  possible  responses.  First,  one  can 
point  out  that  thrrhc*.it  the  exercise  (that  considered  by  Holtham am 23 
Th4es  Haflett,  as uth as  by  Frankel ar ckett), it is  assumed that 
policy-makers do  nct  revise their nailtiplier estisates  just because the 
target variables  turn cat in the next peried to take different values eros 
the ones they expected.  (D1icitly,  they assign the error to a transitory 
distuibance.  This is the alternative to assumir that they gradually upate 
their nLatiplier estimates in a Bayesian way until they converge  on the true 
ei20  It wld certainly be  foolish  to represent  anyone  as plete1y 
revisir his  imfltiplier estimates  eath  period  so  that  his nel fits 
perfectly the latest data point.)  It folls that it wld not be rational 
to  expect  the other policy-maker  to  abroate  the  agrenint next  period, 
because  the other policy-maker  is )ain to believe  in a nel that will 
continue to make  the agresiEnt appear  advantagec*is.  It is not as  if the 
other policy-maker  will be able to a.ise the first of bad  faith.  If the 
first  keeps  his prosise to set his policy  instzinnents  in the way  agreed 
u, it is not his fault if the ecorny respQs in an unexpected  way. 
The  secor  possible  response  to the point is to admit that policy- 
makers in international rotiations are less likely to reath agreement on a 
coordination package if they have prof.irly different vis of the rld 
ard  thus  have diffinfity cosrLlnicatirq at all.  This  argument does  not 
charge the clusion that uncertainty  constitutes a seris obstacle  to 
sussful policy  coordination.  It sisply reclassifies  sos  of the  1,000 
canbinatior.  as cases where coordination does not even get past the talkirg 
stage.  rd there is nothir  to guarantee that those "sustainable"  cases 
where  the  coordination  does  take  place  will  have  a  higher  incidence of 
20 iosh  ard  Masson  (1988b)  examine the  iitplications of havirg  the 
policy-makers  upate  their  isels  in  a  Bayesian  way,  an  interesting 
extension of the original problen. 24 
welfare  gains  than that  reflecta in the statistica that cxxnt  all  1,000 
cases  21 
carrjiri  this loic one st  further, we can isider the subset of 100 
cases where the two cntries agree on a sir1e model.  again,  this does not 
necessarily improve the diaz that the chosen iel is the correct . 
In  Frankel  ar ckett  (1988,  330),  for the  subset  where the .mtries 
agree, coordination turns it to result in tJ.  S.  gains in 65 percent of the 
cases,  ar rest-of-world  gains in 59  per cent of the  cases.  Holtham arxl 
Hughes Hallett  (1987,  25)  reach a similar cor1usion:  ji.ãed by the correct 
model, only slightly over half the cases result in gains. 
Frenkel, Goldstein  arv3.  Masson  (1988,  30—3 1)  offer sa further defenses 
of  coordination,  these  in response to the  point  made  by  Cxñiz az Sachs 
(1984)  ani others that the gains frce coordination are irically  to 
be small, even unier the normal certainty assi.mtion  (which is the best case 
in that the gains are necessarily positive).  First,  they cite a firirq of 
Hoitham ani Hughes Hallett  (1987)  that the gains frce coordination turn it 
larger when other target variables  such as the excharge rate are inoli.x. in 
21 In  any  case  it wld not hurt to try the count  on  the 
subset of cases where the mtries believe that both will gain.  I have  not yet  done this for all  10 models  (100  cathinations).  at the tables in Frankel ani Rockett  (1988)  can be us to do 
the nt  for four els.  Out of the 16 canbinations,  8 cases 
are eliminat&3. if it is assun that coordination does not take 
place  when  one partner thinks that the other  would  lose  by the 
propose:1  package.  Out  of the 8  renainir  "sustainable"  cases, 
ard the corresporkirg 32 possible axtcais, the U.S. turns  aft to 
gain in 24  cases ani the rest of the OE in 22 cases.  These are 
only  slightly  better  odds  in favor of coordination than result 
when all canbinations are ccnsider admissible. 25 
the cbjective function.  Pqainst this fIrir  m1st be balaix, the pr1e 
that uncertainty  poses  for dicosing the  exchange rate as one of the target 
variables; the matric record shows  even greater uncertainty  as to the 
effects  of iaonic policies  on  exchange  rates  than  on  tpt, 
inflation ar  the trade  balance. 
Frenkel, Goldstein aM Nasson point xxt two  further  limitations of the 
Cudiz-Sachs  aroath:  that it does  not provide an elicit staniard of 
ccsparison when it pron.zces the gains  frcin coordination "enall," aM that 
it asss that the "crxterfacthal"  (what ld  happen  in the absence of 
coordination)  is optimization by  policy-makers  in the Nash ncrcperative 
equilibriun,  which  is  not ns-arily realistic.  These  two  points  are 
siimiltanecsly aressed by  an experimant  reportad  in Frarikel  aM Rockett 
(1988,  332, table 7) aM Franks]. (1988, tables 13  aM 14).  There the gains 
fron  coordination,  uMer the best-case asm.mption that the policy-maker 
tie troe irel, are  x*ipared to the gains to a sirqle policy—maker, 
who may previisly  have believad an incorrect irel, of discoverir the tnie 
tcdel  aM  unilaterally adjusting his policies aordingly  [while  staying 
within the Nash  noncooperative  equilibrium].  In a majority of cases,  the 
gains fran coordination are mnall  cceipar&1 to the gains fr  a unilateral 
switch to the correct ite1  [9 to 6 for the U.S. aM 12 to 4 for the rest of 
the OECD,  in each case assuning that the partner  knows the correct el  all 
along]. 
Thus it renains tre that the distacles to successful coordination are 
formidable,  even  in  a  sieplifiad.  one-peri frazework  with  enforanient 
assw to be autanatic. 26 
II.  B. 2 Prl  of enforcrnt ar the G—7  irdicators 
Canirq  fran r  sideration of the prcbleee of urertainty,  several 
corditions  wild  seen  to  be  essei*.ial  for  any  cooperative  agreent to 
"stick."  First,  each rtxini of coordination a.ist spify clearly what is 
expected of each party.  It is hard enca.h to enfot a clear-cut agrent, 
because  each  party has an incentive  to cheat:  enforxnt is hopeless if 
the parties have not even spelled xt what is required of th.  [en OPEC 
ministers  ccate  ,.zt  of  a  Vienna nets withit  havir agreed upon  oil 
pruction quotas  for their xntries, it is prcbably a safe bet that the 
members will not be withhoidirg c*itpit in the caxun interest; enfornent 
is hard encii)1 even when the agretnt is explicit.] 
Secor,  for the parties to be held accntable,  the variables that they 
mnit to itn.st,  to the mnaxim.un  extent possible,  be both cImservable  ard urder 
the  control  of  the  goverrmEnt authorities,  ard  in  particular  urder  the 
control of those authorities involved  in the international rotiations.  It 
is for this reason  that when the International. netary Fwi neotiates a 
"letter of  intent" with the  Finance Minister  of a  borrowing ccuntry,  the 
"perfonnance  criteria"  that are agreed  upon tenl to be variables directly 
under the  control  of  the  authorities,  such  as  the  growth  rate of  the 
Itonetaxy base,  rather than  variables  that are  harder to control  like the 
broad noney supply,  let alone the ultinte target variables  like inflation. 
Otherwise,  the  national  authorities cculd  always  clam  that  a  subseg.ment 
failure to satisfy a performance criterion was beyond their control. 27 
It is rt essential that the variables  be uer the precise short-run 
control of the  atrthorities,  especially if pliar  with the agre1Ent  is 
only to be cked on a basis of,  say, once a year at annual reviews  by the 
fl ("article  IV  Consultations")  or  at Simunit  Neetirgs  of  the  Heads  of 
State,  or twice a  year at maetirgs of the Finance Ministers.  It is only 
essential that there be an una±igUS si  to the relationship between the 
policy  instr'mnt5  that  under direct  control ar the variable to which 
the parties imiit, ar that the lags in the relationship nct be too lor. 
hen the variable begins to deviate seris1y frce the  agreed-Upon rare, 
the policy—makers  begin to adjust the policy instr.mEts accoxdirYly.  Then 
the  policy-maker  at the er of the  year  can be held amtable for any 
large deviations frcin the agreement. 
The  third  necessazy  corition p.ills the o?o6ite  direction frce the 
secor.  The  variables that the parties tit  to ituist be closely eixh 
tied to the target  variables  in their ultite cbjectiVe function that if 
there turns  cit  to  be  an unexpected  disturbanCe  in  one  of  the ecornic 
relationshiPS  [or  if one of the tfltiplierS belorifl  to an agreed policy 
c1arge turns it to be different than expected], the cantry will not be too 
drastically  harmed.  If the cntry ccatunits to a specific riuner for the 
rrnetary base  or  the  itcney  suply, ar  there  are shifts  in  the  xtrney 
xs.ltiplier or velocity that translate that number into a severe ar needless 
recession,  it is cviS that the ntrf will break its ccamnitment.  There 
utust also be a sisilar link between the variables  that each party conTrnits to 
ard  the  other  cnty'5  target  variables.  A  ntrY will  not  be  as 
iressed when its partner sticks to its meney grth target if this turns 
out to be disadvantage to it (for example because a disturbance ives it 28 
to the overly inflationary side of full esployeent, or because the partner's 
ltcney grth turns it  to be transmitted negatively rather than positively). 
At  the  Tbkyo  Stm!nit  of  May  1986,  it  was  decided  that  the  G—5 
c.mtries, or thexforth the G—7, ild focus in their meetirqs on a set of 
10 "cjective irLicators":  the grth rate of QP, Interest rate, Inflation 
rate, unenplcznnt,  ratio of the fiscal deficit to QW,  current acccunt and 
trade  ba1ars,  xiney  grth  rate,  international reserve holdirxs,  and 
excharie rate.  No pretense was e  that the ners  wci1d rigidly cnit 
to specific n.nrbers for these  iricators,  in the sense that sanctions ild 
be iiosai on a ccuntzy if it deviated far fron the values agreed upon.  Rit 
the  plan did incli.e the U  erstandir that apprriate resedial nasures 
v1d be  taken  whenever there  develcped  significant  deviations  fron  the 
"interded cairse."  The indicators are viewed as prototypes of the variables 
that representatives  bargain over if coordination ware to becae tre 
seris.  The current G—7  system ld  be viewed as an attenipted case of the 
"epeilon-sinall" degree of  coordination intior at the beginning  of this 
paper,  a necessary stage  for b.1ilding  confidenee  before nving on to nre 
birthrg forns of coordination. 
The list has been further  discussed, arid trintn dn, at suequent G— 
7  neetirs.  By the tine of the Venice  St.mnit  in June  1987,  the list had 
been  reduced  to  six  indicators:  grith,  inflation,  trade  balances, 
government bñgets,  nnetary  conditions,  arid  exchange rates.22  Treasury 
22  This list did not appear in the tuuunique, bit rather in connts  to  the  press  by  the  U.S.  Treasury's  ssistant  Secretary  vid ilford.  Finabashi  (1988,  esp.  p.130  ff.)  offers  a  fascinating  acccunt  of  the  nachinations of the G—7  nechanien fron 1985 to 1987. 29 
Secretary James Baker,  hcMeVer,  in Cctck'er 1987 told the D' Annual iieetir 
that "the tinited States is prepared to consider utilizir, as an itional 
jiicator in the coordination process,  the relationship anEq r  currencies 
ai a basket of omities, ixxl.ing gold. . .."  At the Toronto  Sununit of 
June  1988,  "the  G—7  cintrie5 weloctQd the aition of a cxadity price 
iricator ai the  progress  made  tjaxd  refining the  analytical  use  of 
iniicators."23 
The  French  Finance  Minister  ard Balladur  singled  it  five 
jxxicators  after the  G—7  neeting of  December 23,  1987  (a "L.zvre greement 
II").  He writes of "a system based on international cooperation bñlding on 
the  spirit  of  the  I.s*Nre 1greenentS.  Their  enforcement  requires  close 
surveillance  of  each of the major  econonies  on  the basis of  such  econonic 
indicators  as  grcMth rates,  fiscal balance, balance of  payments,  interest 
rates ar ecange rates.  This  surveillance  is already being established 
gradually."24 
It is sonewbat difficult to rrile these optimistic  statennts that 
sate  aimmt of  substantive  coordination is  already takirg place with  the 
fact that G-7  meetings  do  nct publicly artxe the targets agreed to for 
the indicators.  H can  any pressure be br4t  to bear on ntrieS that 
stray  fron  the  agreed-Upon  targets  (wbether  it  is  ix,ral  suasion, 
enaIrasItt,  the effect  on  long-term  ritatiOflS,  or itright sanctions) 
23 ISY, September 26,  1988,  p.292. 
24 "Rebuilding  an International  Monetary System," Wall Street Jcurnal, 
Feb.  23,  1988,  p.28. 30 
if the targets thelves are not made poblic?25 
Ireed,  the  G-7  guards  with trncus secrj the  values  of  the 
injicators,  even nore  so than the central banks guard the secrecy of their 
foreign exchare market interventions.  Theory says that the sus of a 
target za,  for exdare rates  for exauçle,  is enhairI when  speculators 
are made aware of the  zrarjes26  1y does the G-7 ke, thee secret?  One 
possible  answer  —  drawn  fran central  bankers'  view  of  the  finaxial 
markets,  not  fran econanists'  —  is that the  G—7  believe that  short-term 
foreign exdiare speculation  is destabilizlrg,  ar that creation of short- 
term urxrta.inty  as to what the authorities will do is a way of disragi 
such  speculation.27  limther possible answer is that they do  not  want to 
lose  face  when  the  exchange  rate  subsequently  breaks  axtside  the  band. 
This answer fits in well  with one's suspicion that the 0-7 meetings  niay is 
fact  reach  no  substantive  agreents, bit  find it politically useful to 
issue crimiiiniques nevertheless;  the caimuniques are sufficiently vague that 
each mether can interpret thee to his an advantage.  28 
25 To take a recent exanple, in the Baker-Miyazawa  greement  reached in 
San  Franoisco  in  Septeeber  1986  [and  subsequently broadened  to  inolt 
Germany  and  the  others at  the  Lcuvre  in  February  1987],  the  Japanese 
apearently  agreed to a fiscal eansion is exchange for a pranise fran the 
U.S.  Treasury Secretary  that he uld stop  "talking down" the dollar  (plus  the  usual U.S. pranise to  cut  the biciget deficit).  In the months that 
followed,  each  side viewed  the other as not living  up to the agrent.  (The 
episode is described  in P\.mabashi (1988)).  Bit it was difficult for anyone  to  verify  the  extent  of  capliance,  because  the  precise  terms  of  the 
original agreeint had not been p.iblic. 
26  See  Krugman  (1988)  for  the  alication of  the  latest  "snooth 
pasting" technology to this prublexn. 
27  and FrarJJ  (1988, section 111.6). 
28 It is clear  fran  Funabashi  (1988)  that the  varic*is members  held 
differing  views  as to which  indicators were nost  iitortant,  what responses 
were  called  for  if indicators strayed  fran  the  agreed-upon  path,  and l, 31 
The  G-7  list  of  iricators  is  not  especially  well-'suit.  to  the 
desirable  cor.itions  for  workable  ooord.thation  stat  ahove.  It  is 
difficlt to  inagine a G-7  meeting  alying meral  censure to  of  its 
ibers for having ecperierd a higher rate of real growth during the year 
than  had  been  agreed upon  in  the preceding meeting,  or a  lower  rate  of 
inflation. 
The uin prchlem with the list is that it is too long to be practical. 
chen  each  ntxy  has  ten  irdicators  b.t  only  two  or  three  policy 
instxnts,  it  is  virthally  certain  that  the  irdicators  will  give 
oonflicting  signals  axxi  that  the  national  authorities  will  feel  no 
constraint on their setting of policy instruments.  Frenkel, Goldstein ard 
Nasson  (1988,  22)  note that  ons  azgimnt  in  favor  of  choosing  a  single 
inlicator  is  the  point that  when  ailtiple  irdicators  serd conflicting 
signals, authorities can hide behinI the confusion.  They also serve that 
imltiple  iixicators  can  er1rage  "ovezoniination:"  setting  a  single 
itxlicator all each cntry to retain  sane degree of freedan in setting 
its nnetazy  ard  fiscal policies.  In this light, a serious coordination 
scheme might j3  in the l990s by setting only one irdicator,  ard then only 
progress  to  ccztnninents  to  uvltiple  variables  when  axx  if  sufficient 
political consensus  ard confidence has develcçed to justify that degree  of 
sacrifice of sovereignty. 
Perba the true list has been,  or will be,  winnowed down to a 1ler 
nuzrber of irdicators?  No  item on the list is a good can±date to be the 
biring the  agreement should  be.  It is also clear that each  was able to 
interpret the  Plaza ard  Lazvre Agreeeents  afteards so  as to reflect his 
own views. 32 
sir1e variable on  which  negotiation  ur.er  a  futhre  cooiination  reiae 
ild focus.  Each wild seen to be dninated by  nziinal QP  (or ninal 
dnarxi).  We  consider each in turn.  Peal  ploynnt, inflation ar 
the trade balance are less directly affected by policy instxiinents than is 
naninal C2P,  aside fran the fact that focussi elusively on any one wld 
destabilize the others.  The nney ly  is nre unier the control of the 
authorities (at least on an annual  basis), bit is ntich less directly 1frked 
to target variables:  it is one unai±igus step  further away frcsi the two 
fuixainenta1  target  variables  of  real  outpit ani the pri level  than  is 
ninal P (that  step,  of rse,  beir the  existence  of  shifts  in 
velocity,  as discussed in  section II  .A  ani dstrated in the eriix). 
Ptherscre we saw in the preceiir  section that the effects of rey  on all 
three target variables [x.xt, pri level, ard trade balance]  in the other 
ntxy  are tpletely anbigucils in sign.  Thus it is a less suitable choice 
of  focus  for  international coordination, even,  than for dtic policy- 
m&drq. 
Fiscal policy is nre easily linked to the foreign target variables  (or 
wld be,  if the high-loynnt deficit were  used as the iricator).  3it 
it is less directly unier the control of the policy-aakers than is the nney 
supply.  itng G-7  ccuntries,  the inability to control the bxget deficit 
has  been  nest  strikir  in  the  case of  the  United  States  in the  1980s. 
Feldstein  (1987,  p.  23-24)  offers a reason  why the United  States will 
be  able  to  participate  in  sericus  international bargainir over  fiscal 
policy: 
"A primary reason  why such macroeconanic policy coor1thation cannot work as 
envisioned  is  that  the  United  States  is  constitutionally incapable of 33 
participating  in  such  a  negotiation.  The  separation  of pers in  the 
Arican form of governt nans that the Secretary of the easury cannot 
pratise to reduce or exparxl the b.xIget deficit or to change tax riiles.  This 
pr  does not rest with the President or the administration bit depends on 
a legislative agrent  between the President ai the Corress." 
xchange rate pe].icy  is of cc.irse a very large tcic in itself, to be 
considered briefly  in the last part  of this paper.  alt we can note sa 
difficulties with  the  exchange  rate  befrg  the single irdicator  that  G-7 
ccunt.ries cmiit to in licy-ordination  agreenents.  If the dollar/rk 
rate begins to  stray .itside the anncrc target  zone,  which of the t 
goverxnts shculd  suffer  sanctions or  a  lose  in rextation?  The  "n-i" 
prthl nans that one cc*.intry  wc.ild have to sit it, presabiy the Unit 
States,  which is not  what  is  warrte:L29  Cntries cculd mnit to certain 
targets  for  their  foreign  exchange  intervention,  or  nre  generally  to 
ixrietary ar fiscal licies, which in theory wc&ld determine the exchange 
rate.  alt —  as already rict&  —  the link fran inacroecori-ic 1icies to 
the exchange rate is frait with even greater uncertainty than the link to 
outpit an  inflation,  even  if one re to  assun  that  the  exchange rate 
might have as great a claim to being in the  cbjective  function as the other 
target variables. 
In the secord part  of the pperdix to this paper, the exchange rate is 
added in to the  chjective  function along  with itpit ard the price level. 
It is shin that the penalty that goes with stabilizing the exchange rate is 
foil/ing  a  mnetary  licy that destabilizes the  overall  price  level, 
relative to a regime of stabilizing ncininal C2P.  Within this fraxnerk, to 
29 Miller aixJ. Willianon (1987)  address the n—l prthlen. 34 
opt for  a  fixed  exchare rate rein,  one has to it trrcxs weight on 
the exchare rate cbjective.  (One has to be prepared to argue that a ten 
percent  fluctuation in the extharqe rate causes  greater trr.le than a ten 
per cent fluctuation in the price level.)  The only other way xit w.ild be 
to ass'. that n51ch  of the disturbai in the exthare rate uation will 
disappear when the regima charges, rather than havir to be aooaxmated  by 
the ncney  supply.30  If we were to make the  xre practical caDparison  of 
exchange  rate  target  zones  versus  nc*ninaJ.  P target  zones,  rather  than 
literally  fixed  exchange rates versus fixed noninal P, the advantages  of 
DT wild be  further boosted  by the aoontabiity point:  if a .1ntry  's 
exchange  rate  strays itside the  target  zone  to which it has ivnitted 
itself, it can always claim that the ncvennt is beyorKt its x,ntrol.  Such 
claims wld be opletely credthle, in light of the large disturbances in 
the exchange rate equation. 
As  for the remainin  three iixlicators  on  the G-7  list,  the interest 
rate,  international reserves,  arxl  the price of gold,  the last is the only 
one that has been proposed as a canlidate  for the sole variable arxu which 
ntries shild coordinate.  Proponents  of a central  role for gold do not 
seen  to appreciate the analytical point that shifts in the demai fwtion 
for  gold,  ar  in  the  other  econceic relationships that link it to the 
target variables  that we ultimately care abc*it,  are even nre unstable than 
shifts in the denarx  for zoney or the denar for foreign exchange, ar1 are 
likely to remain so in the future. 
30 Miller ar Willianson  (1987,  54—55;  1988)  do precisely this: ass.m 
that there is a  large "fad"  carponent  to exchange rate fluctuations urder 
the cirrent  floating regime,  ard that it wild disappear ur.er their target 
zone proposal.  CThe  idea is not absurd.  &zt it certainly "stacks the deck" 
in an empirical caiparison of the two regis.] 35 
This does rt  mean that the price of gold ar other idities is rt 
a gcxxl iricator in the  sense of an early warning signal as to the likely 
future crse of a true target variable, namely the overall price level.31 
In this sense it belcngs with the nzy suly, the interest  rate ar the 
yield curve, ar many  other  leading  irdicators,  on the list of variables 
that policy-makers  may want to nitor on a  short-term basis in attapting 
to  hit  their  targets,  whether  under  a  regime  of  coordination  (e.g., 
International  Nui.rial P  Targeting),  dscentralized  national policy-making 
with  sa ccsunint to  a  ixmiinal  azr.hor  (e.g.,  regular  rxsiinal  QP 
targeting), or catlete discretion. 
In short, if coordination is to begin — on  a scale that is all, ttit 
goes k,eyorxl the stage of mere rhetoric — by sate degree of mnithent to a 
single variable, then ninal (2P (or nmninal denar) ild seen to dcmth-iate 
each of the eleven irxlicators that the G-7 has aarently been discussing as 
the natural cardidate for that variable. 
II.B.  3 Prthlet of inflation-ficthtir cribility 
The  third  of  the  existing itiques  of  international coordination, 
after prl of  uncertainty  are. prl of  enforcnt ar political 
practicality,  is the point made by Ken Rngoff  (1985a): if goverints set up 
the  machinery  for  joint  welfare  maximization  peri-by-perii,  the 
31  indeed there is sate  evidence  that the prices of gold arz  other 
tncdities  react  thstantaneasly  to  dwges  in  expectations  regarding 
whether imnetarj policy will be tight or loose is the future.  (Frankel  arid 
Hardive1iS,  1985.) 36 
oocperative ecpi1ibriti in each  period is likely to entail a greater degree 
of e  ansion,  ar thereby in the  lorg rtm  to urziexine  the  goverrmnts' 
inflation—f  ightirg cribility ar to result in a higher inflation rate for 
a given  level  of axtpit.  In the off view,  re  incirig the aathlnexy of 
ooordination is or of the ways that goveiints can crthly pre-it to 
less inflationary paths. 
It is important to realize that the introduction of Iorer-ters issues 
of credibility, ti-iinsistexy ard pre-ccisiitnt can just as easily zm 
in favor of coordination as against it.  32 If the perceived externality or 
shortcanirg  of the  Nash  noxxocperative  equilibrit is that it is  overly 
expansionary,  then the coordination equilibrit, even when arrived at on a 
period-by-period basis, will entail  expansion,  not re.  This is often 
argued  to  be  the  basis  urerlyixq the  Eurcpean  'bnetary Systesi.  The 
thetoric that Schmidt ard  Giscard originally used  in proposing the  in 
the late 1970s stqgested that they were doir so because the United  States 
was nlecting its duty to sucply  to the rld  the public good of a stable, 
non-inflatir,  crrery.  Ten  years later,  many cbservers of the fl. have 
decided  that its success lies precisely in givirg inflation-prone  intries 
like  Italy  ard  Frare  a  crIible  naninal  anchor  for  their  uuetazy 
policies.33  Ccxinuittir to an e,sthange rate parity or bard vis-a-vis a hard- 
currency  co.intry  like  Germany constitutes precisely  the  sort  of  tli- 
consistent l-inflation policy sc*.ight  by  those  who rry that central 
32 noti'er  of  Frenkel-Goldstein-Masson' s arg.mrrts  against  the  claim 
that  the gains fron coordination  are nall is to cite results  of  Currie, 
levine ard Vidalis  (1987)  to the effect that a ccsiparison of the cooperative 
equilibri allcm sae for qavexents to establish reptations with the 
analogcus  noncocperative  uilibritzn  shows large gains to coordination. 
For example,  Giavazzi  ard Pagano  (1988). 37 
bankers left to their n  discretion will be overly expansionary. 
In the case of the ,  there is an  asymmetry.  It is acoepted that 
Gernany is simply 1on to place very large weight on price stability, e 
to its history or for whatever other reasons.  The weaker-currency intries 
can then peg to the  "greater mark area",  if they wish to ixrt inflation- 
fightir credibility.  [There  is a close analc,y  with the  idea  in off 
(l95b)  that if a particular Jnividual  —  say  Paul Voicker  —  is )cn to 
have extr aversion to inflation, then the ca.intry can gain by appointing 
him as Central Banker,  even if the cntry'  S  function pits less 
weight  on fighti inflation;  his tight-imney credibility will  reduce the 
pblic  'S etations of inflation,  axx1  in long-run egt2ilibriun will pruce 
a lr  level  of actual  inflation for any  given level of cutp.it.]  In the 
case of prcposals for rldwide coordination, there is no pres1.mticn that 
the United States  (the natural "Stackleberg"  leader)  in fact has  as  much 
inflation-fighting credibility  as  Germany  arx3.  Japan.  Thus  there  is  no 
automatic  presmtion that year-by-year coordimation sld ler the average 
werld inflation rate rather than raise it. 
The  implication  of  the  credibility  issue  is  that  a  schema  for 
coordination is nore likely in the long-run to preduce gains if the plan has 
the national goverrmEnts ma)dr,  not  just camnitments to each  other on  a 
pericd—by—perio basis, it also sme degree of  camailment  to  a  naninal 
anchor on a longer tenn basis.  Hence the arguments for ooordinatirg arrx! 
the price of gold (Baker, rell, et al)  or arm the glal nney supply 
(cKinnon'  s proposal). t  then all the argtmants  fron the closed-econarj 
context  [discussed in part  II.A)  as to why  ncmtinal P  as a ncaninaJ. anchor 38 
daniriates t1 iey sly, price of gold,  or overall price level, aly 
equally to the world y. 
II.  C H, International  Naninal  G1P Taxetir (INT)  Wa1ld Work 
The  frawork laid t  in Franks].  (1988c,d)  is a very simple one. 
The  G—7 wld xit a.side their list of 10  ixicators, ard wld instead foa.s 
on  naninal  demard  [defiriad  as  runina].  QP minus the balax on  goods ard 
services].  At  each  meeting  the  national authorities ild (a)  mnit 
theJ.ves,  withit  any essively great degree of  firmness,  to  target 
rates of grcith,  or rares,  for their natries' levels of rinal deinard 
for five  years  into the  future,  ard  (b)  camait  thmae1ves,  with  sczmawhat 
greater firmness,  to targets for the canix year.  In the first stage,  i.e., 
the early l990s,  there wfld be no elicit enforcement naniszn.  Bt the 
targets wild be p±licly annaino&I,  ard if a  cc*.mtry's rate of grwth of 
rianinal  demard  turi ait to  err significantly in  one  direction or  the 
other,  the  fact  wa.ild  be  noted  disarovirly at the  next  G-7  neeting. 
This does  not happen urder  the current system.  If the  first stage vere 
suooessful, a future stage might a  another variahle or t  to the list, or 
might  even ccmnmit intries firmly to specific policy responses  in the event 
that their level of naninal demard begins to stray fran the year's target. 
A plan that called for targeting rxmninal (P rather than naninal deinard 
might be itcre readily arxi mnre  widely  urderstcod,  ard  thus might  stard a 
better  chance  of  succeeding  politically.  advantage  of  focussing  on 
nczninal  denard  is  the  assnption  that  when  the  ceoperative  equi1inri.nn 39 
entails expansion, tntries need to be dis<xraged  fran the ttation to 
aooaplish the epansion of cutp.xt thrh net  foreign de!nar,  for exaitle 
thrcih protectionist trade asures, as cosed to datic denarxl.  In 
se years  the coerative equilibri may entail contraction  rather than 
expansion,  ar then a nczninal P target might be preferable  to a  naninal 
denar target.  3.zt it is usually th4it that the political pressure  for 
protectionist trade ries  is greater in recessions than in expansions,34 
which points to ncaninal dai  as the sterior choice.35 
Cntries  ccAfld  attain their naninal  GP  or riidraJ. denar1  targets 
thrcgh  any  of  several  rtes.  one  possibility,  for  example,  is  the 
Willianon-Miller (1987)  "blueprint",  which assigns  fiscal policy  in each 
cnt3y the  responsibility for  attainir a  naninal  dnar target  (are 
assigns  nonetaxy  policy in  each  ntay  responsibility for  the  exchange 
rate36).  3.it at least one  seris prleu arises  if fiscal policy  is 
explicitly  specified  as  the  policy  instrnent  with which aitries are 
expected to  attain the ncininal  demand targets that they  agreed to.  When 
their econanies  stray away fran the target the authorities will  claflu that 
it is not politically possible to adjust fiscal policy quickly.  Such clams 
Cornbsch ani. Frarikel  (1987)  note sane qualifications, relevant for 
the U.S.  political process, to this staniaxd view of protectionist plres. 
3  Besides  subtracting fran total (P that part goirg to the  foreign 
sector  (the trade balanoe), it might also be a good idea to subtract that 
part going to inventories as suggested by Gordon  (1985). 
36 The  Miller-Williaxion blueprint also specifies that the G-7  shculd 
set the average  level  of their interest rates  so as to attain a target for 
the areate level of their GPs.  This  part  of their plan is similar to 
Part  (a)  of my proposal.  It is my part  (b),  cooperative yearly setting of 
each  country's  naninal dt target,  to  be  attained primarily  thrigh 
nnetary policy,  that differs  the cost  fran their  plan  Laside  frau  my 
treatsient of exchange rate stability as a separable issue]. 40 
will be cxx1etely crelthle, because they will generally be true.37 
An agrent is scre likely to stick if ntaxy policy is specifi&I as 
the policy instr.ment that cntries are expect to use,  rather than fiscal 
policy.  Even if fiscal policy is assi. to be no e  subject to lags ax 
political erxthrar than is nKretary policy,  there is another reasen for 
assignir nxretary policy to the nxiJ.nal  danarx target.  If .intries also 
pirsue trade balanoe targets  (are it seese that they  do,  whether  or not 
they  shld),  then  the  classic  "assignsont prublen"  is  relevant.  The 
general rule is to assign responsiblity for the trade balarce target to that 
policy  instrunsnt that  has  a relatively  greater  effect  en  it  (4zdell, 
1962).  I  agree  with  8cuhton  (1989)  that  urder arn oitions of 
floatirg  exoharge  rates,  whith  work  to  decrease  the  effectiveness  of 
nnetary  policy  with  respect  to  the  trade  balarce  ard  increase  the 
effectiveness  of fiscal policy,  this ns assignir fiscal policy to the 
trade balar target ard nrretary policy to the daistic target. 
what is the precise instrument of xetaxy policy that shild be adjustad 
when rnina denard drifts away frcsi the target?  The nrretary base or level 
of unborrsi reserves s.i1d be better than the broader iazetary aggregates 
because the  central  bank  controls then nre directly.  (The  short-term 
interest  rate is another  possible  instrument.)  ?alltnn  (1988,  15)  has 
For attenpts to evaluate enpirically the stabilIzing properties of  the blueprint  plan,  see Miller ard Willianeen (1988)  ard Flenkel, Goldstein  ard Masscri  (1988,  33—49).  Frerikel  ar1 Goldstein (1986)  survey target za 
proposals.  Miller  ard Willianon also consider a floatirq  rate regise arxl  the Kinrcn (1984)  proposals to use netazy policy to target the aggregate 
ncney suly — or In a later  version the aggregate price level —  the 
G—3  ccxintries.  Kithen ard  Sacths  (1988)  also are these regimes.  As 
yet,  I  am  not  aware of  eipirical work  evaluatirg the  likely c*ite if  ntries cooperatively set rianinal P  targets  [ard use netary policy to  attain them]. 41 
suested a specific feack rule in the caxtext of clos-ecany  policy— 
making that might  do well here.  His proea].  is that for each  per cent 
that rninal P  deviates fr its target  in a given  quarter,  the  tary 
base be e  anied an aitiona1  .25 per  cent aver the subeegient quarter.  He 
snggests setting a trer. grth rate in the target of  3  per  cent  per  year, 
ani subtraCting frcin this the average grth rate of base velocity aver the 
preceding fr  years. n altaative possibility wuld be to replace the 3 
per  cent target with "a n.ber to be negotiat1  for each mter of the G—7 
each year,  with a plar long-nm tendency of 3 per cent." 
The  central bank ld  be better able to hit its annual  uninal  dexnarx 
target if it was all  to respcr to other available  fonnation, besides 
just the most recent icnthly figure for naninaJ.  denan. itself.  Ben Frien 
(1984,  183—84),  for exaile, shs  that such iricators as the nney suly 
a  the  stock of  creiit  can be usef to prict  iinre  accurately  deviations 
fr a niral incc*ne target.  Many other  "leading iricators"  cculd be 
aed  to  the list.  The cenolusion s  to be that it ld  be better in 
practice to leave the maans of attaining the rinal denai target up to the 
national  authorities,  rather than  requiring  that they folli a particnlar 
rule like allum's. 
It might be ject  that this entire  discussion of ccorthation via 
fl  has rlect  important questions of the mix between crtarj an fiscal 
policy,  the real interest  rate,  amf  the exchange rate.38  These  questions 
38  A relat cjection is that a plan for using itnetaxy policy  to 
target  ncaninaJ.  P  ild  have  dora  little  to  prevent  the  major 
disñlthri that  arose  in  the early 1980s,  the U.S. get ar trade 
deficits.  3.it I agree with  Feldstein (1983) that this disequiliJDri1m was 
not a "coordination failure,"  that the U.S.  ninistration did not to any 42 
are considerad next. 
III. rorcy IND  DF u  FraBIuTy 
One  nasure  of  the  degree of maonic policy vergere ax 
.mtries  is  the  magnitixle  aid  variability  of  the  real  interest 
differential.  off (1985c)  for exaiple shows that real interest rates are 
not perfectly rrelated aoss  European  ca.intries,  aid  argues that this 
shows  that  European  ccntries  retain  se policy  irdeperxlence.  One 
apestion,  posed  by cIservers  of the Eurcpean )kinetary  Systas in particular, 
is whether  such irdeperderce is attribotable to capita]. ntrols aid other 
remainirg  barriers  to  the  free  nov  nt  of  capital  across  national 
bcurdaries,  or whether it is attrihitable to exchange rate flexibility.39 
extent pursue the policies it did as a result of insufficient eansion by  tradirg partners.  Irdeed the At±ninistration  did not even want aircpe ax 
Japan to  exan1,  until after  1985.  No  International  bargain ild have  brht abc.it  a  U.S.  fiscal  crrection.  Only  a  rnition by  the 
Pdiniriistration ard  Corqress  of the link betwaen their fiscal policies ar  the  trade  deficit  (tcether with  the  political will  nssaxy to  make  difficult k*xlget  choices) wild have  done so.  By the same  token, neither 
INT  nor  any  other  proposals  for  onord.thation  sha.ild  be alld to 
distract attention from  the point that the nost ieçortant policy ctharmes to 
be  made  in  1989  can  be  made  unilaterally  by  the  United  States.  Sud 
thom.ghts  are suçorted  by  the flrdirs in  Frankel  ard Rockett  (1988)  ar 
Frankel  (1988)  that the  gains  from  ordination  are usually aaller than 
the gains  fromn  the United  States discovering the true el  aid unilaterally 
adjustir its policies aaordirmly. 
A  nusber  of  authors,  irclidii off  (l985c)  aid  Giavazzi arr 
Giovannini  (1988),  have pointed cut that European  plans to decrease both th 
ranaining degree of  exchange rate flexibility aid the  ranaining  level  o 
barriers to finarial integration may  run  Into txble, if the  irdividua2 43 
III  .A Finanoial irrteiration. bretaiV intration, ax Iriepeix1er 
Frarikel ar NacrtbUr (1988) stiie real interest differentials for 24 
czrtries,  fran  1982 up to early 1987, ar deoaoeed then into a caiczent 
attrft*itable to iserfect finarial integration (the "ccntzy preni') ax 
a  cc*iiponerit  attrit*itable to  exchare  rate  variability  (the  ".irrency 
prenium").  Table 1 sbs real interest differentials for 25 cantries, vis- 
a-via the Eurllar, upat&I thrcu3h the b  nriin  of  1988.  [It is taken 
fran Frankel (1989).]  Both the maan of the differential ai the seasures of 
variability sbi subataritia-l  iixeper]eiXe for each of the ctries.  Table 
2  uses  forward  exchare rate data for  each  currenoy to separate  cit the 
cover  interest  differential,  which  represents  the  cciiçonent  due  to 
inçerfect finanoial  integration.  The covered interest differential  is very 
small for the G-lO intries (ixltir Switzer1ar)  except for Fraz ai 
Italy,  ar is also very small  for Austria,  Sirapore ai Hcr Kor.  Even 
for  the  other  cc*.intries,  which  often  have  significant  barriers  to 
international finanoial  integration, the camtry preni is in arst cases 
smaller than the currency  preniurn.  This says that for the major ntries, 
ar many  others as well,  excthare rate variability is a greater sarce of 
policy iix1epenerx  than is imperfect financial integration. 
Different  views  are  possible  on  whether  or not policy  ix1eperienoe 
makes  for a ire sxm,cthly-nmnir world uny.  Corden  (1983)  argues that 
dentralized  decision-ma1drY  aimrg mtries  is re efficient,  because 
each cntry knis better its n  situation.  His  is an argumant in favor of 
ca.intries are not ready to give up their renainir policy  irieperence. n 
.'Urn-: Vt  !;ri1a LVs Ral)nL Infit:cn  Diffrerci:ia1 
:.eotC,ijttr.  112  tic 
1 
4*  of  Standard 
Jhc.  N1aaj-  Error 
62  i.o'  0.33 
o3  —1.29  0.65 
62  —0.71  0.86 
62  —2.72  0.81 
63  0.46  0.79 
313  —0.83  0.66 
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1  .  07 
0.  8  1 
0.90 
0.62 
1  .83 
0.73 
All Countries  1531  —1.74  6.47  8.0 Table  2: 
llter'25t Differential Less Forward  Discount 
September,  li82 to  April,  1988 
1  2  3 
Series  Root  Mean 
1*  of  Standard  Standard  Squared 
Ohs.  Mean  Error  Deviation  Error  951  Band 
Open Atlantic  DOs 
Canada  68  —0.10  0.03  0.21  0.24  0.44 
Germany  68  0.35  0.03  0.24  0.42  0.75 
Netherlands  68  0.21  0.02  0.13  0.25  0.45 
Switzerland  63  0.42  0.03  0.23  0.48  0.79 
United  Kingdom  68  —0.14  0.02  0.20  0.25  0.41 
Group  340  0.14  0.01  0.21  0.34 
Liberalizinq Pacific  LDCs 
Hong Kong  48  0.13  0.03  0.28  0.31  0.60 
Malaysia  63  —1.46  0.16  1.28  .  1.95  3.73 
Singapore  61+  —0.30  0.04  0.31  0.43  0.73 
Group  195  —0.52  0.05  0.76  1.14 
Closed LOGs 
Bahrain  64  —2.15  0.13  1.06  2.41  4.17 
Greece  58  —9.39  0.80  6.08  11.26  20.39 
Mexico  43 —14.47  1.83  12.01  20.54  28.86 
Portugal  61  —7.93  1.23  9.59  12.49  27,83 
South  Africa  67  —1.07  1.17  9.55  9.61  2.68 
Group  293  -6.64  0.48  8.23  11.82 
Closed European DOs 
Austria  65  0.13  0.05  0.39  0.41  .0.39 
Belgium  63  0.12  0.03  0.26  0.29  0.59 
Denmark  46  —3.53  0.19  1.57  3.89  6.63 
France  43  —1.74  0.32.  2.68  3.20  7.18 
Iceland  66  —0.79  0.51  4.17  4.24  7.80 
Italy  63  —0.40  0.23  1.92  1.96  4.11 
Norway  50  —1.03  0.11  0.76  1.29  2.10 
Spain  67  —2.40  0.45  3.66  4.39  7.95 
Sweden  68  —0.23  .  0.06  0.45  0.51  0.81 
Group  583  —1.10  0.09  2,25  2.77 
Liberalizing  Pacific DCs 
Australia  68  —0.75  0.23  1.94  2.08  2.59 
Japan  68  0.09  0.03  0.21  0.23  0.43 
New  Zealand  68  —1.63 
-  0.29  2.42  2.92  -  5.24 
Grcup  204  —0 76  0 12  1 78  2 06 
All Countries  1620  —1.73  0.09  3.81  5.36 44 
the current floatirg—rate system.  Kinrri  (1988),  on the other haril, takes 
it for granted that r1d econcmnic efficiery riires that real  interest 
rates be alized  across ntriea [presumably so that the marginal pr.1ct 
of capital  is ualized across .intries].  His is an argumant in favor of 
refora of the system so as to reduce excharge rate variability. 
III.B A  Prcosal  for  Bethnfl to  Stabilize are Rates:  The  "Hosani 
Wculd-be  reforitrs of the world ixnetary system have a choice.  If they 
wish to all each  cx.intry  enhanced policy  irdeperIence,  they can seek to 
decrease the  degree of finanoial  market integration.  Alternatively,  like 
McKinnon  (1983,  1988)  an  Williaon (1983),  they can  opt for  irreased 
policy nvergere  and  exchare  rate stability.  [Frenkel,  Goldstein and 
Masson  (1988)  refer to  a  choice beten decreasir the demand  for policy 
ordination  and irwreasir the suly.]  Frankel (1988b)  nsiders one of 
the  ncst-mantioned  proposals  for  deasing  the  degree  of  financial 
intration,  the  "Tchiri tax"  on  foreign  exchange transactions.  Here  I 
discuss  another particular proposal that others have  made  for stabilizing 
exchange rates.4° 
40 rnbsch  and  Frankel  (1988)  discuss  ten  proposals  for  world 
netary  reform.  F.ir entail decentralized  policy  rules:  new  classical 
fatalin,  a gold  standard,  national zretarin, and national naninal  incczne 
targeting as discussed in section hA.  Fair foresee enhai coordination: 
the  G-7  indicators  as discussed in section  Part  IIB,  Willianon'  s  target 
zones,  McKinnon' s  "world  inonetariem,"  and  the Hosani  Ftixxl.  Two  propose 
enhanced  independence:  the  Tcbin  tax  on  transactions  and  the  Drnlsch 
proposal for a dual exchange rate. 45 
several years ago,  Takashi Hosati (1985)  proposed the creation of a new 
supranational fuz that ld intervene in foreign  ex±ange markets.  The 
Japanese Vice-Minister of Fthare for International Affairs,  Toyoo  Gyoten, 
has recently floated precisely this sort of proposal  •41  sax recent talk 
of a European Central  Bank,  heard both  in official ar acadenic circles, 
strikes a sinilar rte42 
The prcsal envisions a  furs. that ld  uniertake  operations in the 
open international markets, it ild rt replace the irividual cantries' 
central banks.  A plausisle ntivation for this approach is precisely the 
one presented in the intruction to this paper: the need  for proposals for 
nnetary reform that are politically practical in that they ld  begin  on a 
very all scale, gradually biild up nfidere axaeg the players,  arx:1 then 
isrease the scale of crdination accordi1y.  In this case,  the size of 
the fur constitutes the variable that ild begin with a all "epsilon" 
ar.  subseqently  increase  to  reflect bever  itn.ich  political  consensus 
exists. 
isions cld be  made  by  an  "Open  Market  Ccmxnittee"  consistir 
primarily  of  representatives  of  the  individual  central  banks,  with votes 
presmbly awarded in prrtion to the size of their ecoaies or the size 
41 "A  New  Collar  for  Cuzrery  Markets,"  The  International Econry, 
May/June 1988,  pp.36—38.  (See also  Wall Street Jrnal, Septenter 25,  1987, 
p.22.) 
42 in the  case of  Europe,  it see that  a unified currency is the 
ultiate goal  (ar a  strerxthened role for the ecu is nsidered the first 
step).  In  ugust  1988,  a  European  Castiunity  stnind.t maetir  agreed to 
establish a cattmittee  that ild study creation  of a xicnetary union an to 
examine the  issue at a Madrid maetir scheduled  for June  1989.  See Casella 
arxl Feiristein (1988)  for a theoretical analysis. 46 
of their itribition of international reserves to the fur, as is the case 
with  the  International !bnetaly Furx,  bit  with cperati decidi by  a 
inalian voter nile.  [The Bank for International Settlnts i1d also serve 
as a e1; ire it is eivable that an  parxa BIS caild serve,  In 
place of f.irir yet ancther irrternat.ional institution.]  In the event that 
France,  say,  wishes to dazpen depreciation of the  franc against the dollar 
bit is cutvot by a majority  in  favor of dollar porchases,  the Bank  of 
France  is  still  free to  intervene in the cççosite direction on its n. 
intries will at first be giviz up very little sovereignty when they agree 
to the  establisiment  of  such a fwd because it will be on  a  email  scale. 
Only  if  all  parties  are  happy with  the  outcax  w.ild  the  size  of  the 
portfolio — ar therefore  the potential loss of national sovereignty — be 
reaseI. 
III.  c conclusion 
This  paper has  examfl  two  possinle  reforma  of  the  world  nnetary 
reform.  Both are design so as to try to overc the seris chetacles to 
successful coordination that are itlin in section II.  B.  In particular, 
both are design in such a way that they can bein on  a  emall scale, ar 
then grov as the degree of political consensus grs. 
The IN proposal is the aropriate one if the shortcanir of the Nash 
noncooperative  equilibrium is thight to be either insufficient or excessive 
expansion.  The Hosoni proposal is the aropriate one if the shortconirx is 
thht to lie with the exchare rate.  The question arises whether the two 
are  caipatible,  whether  they  can  be  inpleeent siimiltanecusly if the 47 
noncooperative  equilibriue is thht to be characterized  by both sorts  of 
shortccEfrqs. 
If  the  Hosaai  Fund  is  foreseen to  affect  exchange  rates  only  via 
chances  in iiey supplies,  and nxnetary policy is also foreseen to be the 
instrtment  whereby irxtries attain their rxiina.l  desand targets,  it nit 
sees that there is an overdetereinacy in the systes.  3± I am not sure that 
there is in fact a prclen.  There are s  chvis policy instz'.nnents that 
ld  intrcx±ice extra degrees of freed into the systes:  the Hosoni  Fund s 
intervention  cld be  non-sterilized,  thus  changirg  the  international 
supplies of bonds rather than supplies of rey, or the ccntries c,ild use 
fiscal policy  alside netaxy  policy  to  attain their  rnina1  denand 
targets. 
Even if noney slies are the only available policy instrnts, there 
are  n ney slies to be detennined and n national  opinions as to what 
they shcold be.  So it scunds like there is no overdeterxriinacy prcblem.  At 
arry given tire, the itian voter on the International  Open Market Ccrmittee 
will siply receive extra wa4it in detenninir what the ney supplies will 
be.  it is true that if the nian voter wants the fund to y  a particular 
currency to increase its exchange value,  at the sare tire that the ccuntry 
in question is cbligated  to increase its monetary base in order to correct 
slier-than-targeted grth in its nominal P, then the ccurrtzy will be it 
in an untenable position.  It se  unlikely that the Open Market Ccmmittee 
sld choose  to "pick  on"  a particular inber in this way.  3± this is 
rerely speculation at this stage.  It ld  be desirable  for future research 
to study the isplicatioris of  such a Hosani Fund  with a nian voter rule, 
just as it ld  be  desirable  for  future  research  to  study  a  regine  of 48 
oocperative  ex ante settir of nczninaJ. demar targets.  This  paper  has aily 
tried to point the way, with an examination  of sane advantages  of these twe 
approaches. 
*  *  * 
APPDD 
In this arperxix we canpare fr  possible policy ri:  (1)  floatiog 
exchane rates, with full disetion  by national policy-makers  (the irrent 
regine),  (2)  a rigid ney suly nile,  (3)  a rigid naninal 1P rule, ax 
(4)  a rigid exdare rate rule.  [In the case of eath of the three possible 
naninal  arhors, prants scmietimas  have in mire  a target  zone  system; 
the  assuniption  of  a  rigid  nile  just  makes  the  analysis siiiler.]  The 
approach,  rporatiog the advantages both to rules and disetion, folls 
Rogoff  (1985b)  and Fischer  (1988a),  who in turn foll Kydland and Presostt 
(1977)  and Barro  and Gordon  (1983). 
Thrigh.1t, we ass  an aggreate  su1y  relationship: 
(Al)  y  =  y* + b(p-p5)  + u, 
where y represents  itp.it,  y* potential  it.xt, p  the price level, pe the 
expected price level (or they ld  be  the actual and expected inflation 
rates,  respectively),  and u a  suly  distuxbai,  with  all  variables 
expressed  as logs. 49 
Xixt ax the Price Level  in the Cbiective Furtia 
We bein witht the exchare rate.  The loss furtion is siaply: 
(A2)  L=ap2+(y_ky*)2, 
where a is the  weight  assign. to the inflati cjtive, ar we assme 
that the laod or expected price level relative to which p is measured can 
be normalized  to zero.  We  impose k  >  1,  which ilds in an expansionary 
bias to disetionaxy po1icy-ma)dr. 
(A3)  L = a p2 + [y*(l-k) + b(pp5) + 
L. DisetiOnarV licy 
Urder  full disetion,  the policy—maker  each period  chooses  ?regate 
Demard so as to ininisize that period's L, with pe given. 
(A4)  (1/2) dWdp  =  ap + [y*(l-k) +  b(p_pe)  +  u]b  =  0. 
(A5)  p = [-y*(l-k)b + b2pe  - i] /  +b]. 
Urder rational expectations, 
(A6)  pe  =  Ep  = -y*(l-k)b/a. 
So we can solve  (A5)  for the price level: 
(A7)  p=  _y*(l-k)[b/a] -ub/[a+b]. 
Fon  (A2), the expected  loss function then works out to: 
(AS)  =  (1 + b2/a) [y*(l-k) ]2 + [a/(a+b2)] var(u). 
The  first term  represents  the inflationary bias  in the  systen,  while the 
secord represents  the effect of the suly disturbance after the authorities 
have chosen the optimal split between inflation ard outp.it. 
2.  Money rule 
To  consider  alternative  we mist be explicit  about  the uney 
market  equilibrimit corxiition.  (In  case  1,  it was iitplicit that the xaney 50 
su1y m was the  variable that the  authorities  were  usii to itrol 
d.) 
(A9)  m=p+y-v, 
where v represents velocity shocks.  (We as  V uirre].ated  with u.)  If 
the authorities pre-cc2anit to a  fixed ey grth rule  in order to reduce 
expected inflation  in  lorw-nui euilbritun,  then  they ut give  up  on 
affectir  y.  The  optimal nney grJth rate is the ons that sets Ep at the 
target value for p,  naily 0.  Thus they will set the ney supply m at Ey, 
whidi in this case is y*.  The Aggregate Dear euation tnis becciries 
(AlO)  p+y=y*+v. 
Cctibinin  with the Aggregate Suly relationship (Al), the  eqiilibrium  is 
given by 
(All)  y = y* + (u + bv)/(l+b),  p  = (v - u)/(l+b). 
Substitutir into (A2),  the expected loss furtion is 
(A12)  = (1-k) 2y*2  +  ((l+a)var(tl) + [ab2)var(v) )/  (l+b)2. 
The  first term is aller than the corresporxLir  term in the discretion 
case, because the pre-xsithnt reduces  expected inflation;  bit the secor 
term  is prdably larger, because the authorities have given up the ability 
to  resporxl to ney  demand shocks.  %iith regima is better depends on ho 
big the  shocks  are,  and  hi  big a  weit  (a)  is placed on  inflation- 
fightirq. 
3. Noninal  G1P rule 
In the  case  of  a  naninal (P rule,  the authorities  vary  the  ncney 
suly in such a way  as to acmicdate velocity shocks.  (AlO)  is replaces 
by  the corition  that p  + y is constant.  The solution  is the sama as in 
case  2,  bit  with  the  v  disturbance  drcped.  Thus  the  expected loss 51 
oollaees fran  (A12)  to: 
(A13)  =  (1—k)2y*2  + [(].+a)/(1+b)2]Var(U). 
is  u  abigusly daninates the iey  rule case.  It is still not sible, 
with.xt )  cMing var(u)  or  (a),  to say that the rule dczninates discretion. 
It  is quite  likely,  especially  if the  variarxe  of u  is  large,  that  an 
abeolute cxrtibnt to a  rule ild  be unwisely  constraining.  Henoe  the 
argnt for a target z  rather than a single ranther, ar for subjecting 
the  Central Bank C1airman  to  a nre loss of rL1tation  if he ndsses the 
target rather than  a firing squad.  3± it seiE clear that,  to whatever 
extent  the mtry chooses  to  it to a rxiinal  aior,  rxiinal ? 
dcininates  the iney su1y  as the candidate for ancthor. 
the ciarne Rate to the Oblective Funotion 
We  reconsider  here  a  likely  objection  to  choosing rninal P  or iuriinal 
denar  as the focis of  international  coordination,  that it rlects the 
exchange  rate.  The  alternative  of  setting  iinetazy  policy  so  as  to 
stabilize  the  exchange rate will  riot  look attractive  unless  the  exchange 
rate  enters the  objective  function,  perhaps indirectly via the  corisi.ur 
price  index  or the trade balance.  Here we confront the argument head—on, 
and  incli.e  the  exchange  rate directly  in  the loss  function  along with 
ciutpit and the price level.  Thus we replace  (A2)  with: 
(A14)  L = a p2 +  (y-ky*)2 + c 
where s is the spot exchange rate measure relative to sai iilibriun or 
target value and c is the weit places on exchange rate stability per Se. 
There is no point  in specifying an elaborate ittidel of the exchange rate. 52 
All  the irica1 results  say that t  of the variati in the ecthare 
rate canrt be  exp1ai.n  (even  ex post:  we  say r*.hiz of prictia) 
seasurable macrounic variables, ar thus  can  Qily be  attrib.itel to ar 
error term that we here call e.  ait we imst irle the ney suly In ths 
jiation;  otherwise we  do  not all the authorities the  possibility  of 
affectir the exdaxe rate.  Our uati is sin1y: 
(Al5)  s=m-y+e. 
(we ase that e is urrelated  with the other disthi±arxes.) 
Frcn  (A9), 
(A16)  s=p-v+e. 
We ass that the  sane  Aggregate sly relatiahip lds as  before, 
equation (Al). 
So we can write the loss finotion  (A14)  as: 
(A17)  L  =  ap2  +  [(l-k)y* + b(pp5)  +  U]2  +  c(p—v+e)2. 
We prooeel as before to nsider possible  regiiaes. 
1. Disoretion 
(l/2)dI/dp = ap  +  [y*(l_k) + b(p_pe)  + u]b + c(p—v+e)  0. 
(Al8)  p = [y*  (l-k)b + b2pe  - bi + c(v-e)] / [a+b2fc]. 
The rationally expecta p is given by pe = 
(A19)  pe = -  (1-k)  by*/ (a+c). 
Substithtir Into  (Al9)  yields: 
(A20)  p  -(l—k)y*[b/(a+c)]  +  [c(v-e)—bi]/[a+bZ4-c]. 
'flie loss funotion is 
(A21)  1= [(1-k)y*]2  (a+b2-1-c)/(a+c)  + 
{(a+c)var(u) + c(a+b2)Cvar(v)  +var(e)])/(a+b2+c). 53 
2 ev  rule 
As when  we sidered a ney rule before,  so that expected flation is 
zero the autrities set m at y*, ar (AlO)  alies.  Thus the sane solution 
(All)  for y ar  p  also aplies.  The  xaxe rate is given  by substithtir 
the solution for p  frciu  (All) into (Al6): 
(A22)  s =  e —  [(u+bv)/(l+b)) 
The additional s term is  the only differere frun (A12)  in the expected loss 
fwtion: 
(A23)  EL=  [y*(l—k)]2  +  [(l+a+c)/(l+b2)]Var(U)  + 
[(a+b+d)/(l+b)2)VaZ(V)  + [cjvar(e). 
Aqain the ccviparison with discretion depers on the vari.is magnitixes. 
3 jjnal GP rule 
Wtien  the inetaxy  authorities  are able  to vary  in so as to keep 
p  +  y constant,  the velocity shocks v drop cut.  The  expected loss furtion 
becs 
(A24)  =  [y*(l—k) ]2  +  [(l+a+c)/(l+b)2] var(u)  +  c var(e). 
As before,  the naninal P rule unambigusly doninates the in'ney rule. 
In practice the  e  shocks  in the exchare rate equation are very large. 
They  certainly dwarf the u shocks  in the aggregate suçly equation.  (The 
exchange  rate  often  nves  ten per  cent in a  year,  withcut correspor.ir 
ncvrxts in the itnay suçly or other c1servable nacroeconanic  variables; 
try to imagine similar scvnts of real cxtpit.)  If the weit c on the s 
target is subetantial, then the last term in the expected  loss equation nay 
be isortant. 54 
4 aiue rate nile 
?qain,  the authorities can't affect y in la-rwi  eqiil1brii.m. 3it r, it is 
the exxtharxe  rate that they p  in such a way that Ep = 0, which fros  (A16) 
is s = 0.  The ex post price level is then given by 
(A25)  p=v-e. 
F'rce (Al), 
(A26)  y = y* + b(v-e)  +  U. 
Fros (Al4), 
(A27)  L= (a+b)Var(v-e) +  ty*(1_kfl2+var(u). 
The ocefficierxt on var(e)  is  (a+b2), as ccmared to the ceefficient c in the 
expected loss  (A24)  urxer the rniiia1 P rule.  We  made the point above 
that e  shocks in practice dwarf u shocks.  Reasatixq on this basis, even if 
v  shocks  are also enall ard a (the cjective  furction  pits r  greater 
weight on a 10 per cent fluctuation of the price level than on a 10 per cent 
fluctuation of  the exdare rate),  which  is extrly conservative,  the 
expected loss fron fixir s is greater than the expected  loss frce fixir 
nceinal  CP.  The reason  is that wxer an exchare rate rule  a  shocks  are 
alled to affect the ney suly ard  therefore  the overall price level. 
Once we a1l for v shocks  (which  are prchably in between u ard e shocks in 
maiite), the case  for rianinal lP tazetixr is avert strorer.  One wild 
have  to pit extraordinarily high weight on  the  extthare  rate jective to 
prefer an eathare rate rule. 53 
*  *  *  * 
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